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INTRODUCTION
“Relational (n): Concerning the way in which two or more
people or things are connected.” 1
It was a dark, rainy night when Mary Churukian began her
drive home following her sister’s graduation party.2 When the
rain momentarily subsided, a mist engulfed the intersection of
Chicago Boulevard and Telegraph Road when she approached.
Churukian recalled stopping at a blinking red light before attempting to cross the busy intersection.3 The next things she remembered were “the lights in the hospital.”4
Churukian had collided in the intersection with a vehicle
driven by Clayton LaGest, a serviceman returning home from
leave.5 Among other issues, the trial court had to decide whether
Churukian was contributorily negligent with respect to the injuries she sustained from the collision.6 On this point, the plaintiff’s and defense’s trial strategies markedly diverged. The direct
examination of Mary Churukian was holistic and focused on the
general difficulty that any person would have experienced crossing the intersection under the conditions that night.7 The defense attorney asked more specific questions on cross-examination, probing Churukian about the specific time of the accident,
the exact speed at which she had been driving, whether she

1. Relational, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/relational
[https://perma.cc/N9PT-YK7F]. The Macmillan Dictionary similarly defines relationality as “relating to the . . . connection between two or more things.” Relational, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/
dictionary/american/relational [https://perma.cc/Q88G-NV8B].
2. Churukian v. LaGest, 97 N.W.2d 832, 834 (Mich. 1959) (providing background context).
3. Id. (recounting the appellant’s response to a question posed at trial: “I
came to a stop at Telegraph road. There was a red blinker light there.”).
4. Id. (recounting the following exchange: “Q. What is the last you remember that night? A. Putting the car in motion and observing the lights and then
the lights in the hospital.”).
5. Id. at 834–35.
6. Id. at 833 (“After the completion of plaintiff ’s proofs the judge directed
a verdict for defendant on the grounds of plaintiff ’s contributory negligence.”).
7. Id. at 834 (recounting the appellant’s answer on direct examination at
trial: “I thought I better look to the right again and I looked and saw some lights,
it had been raining that day and it was misty outside . . . I thought I had plenty
of time to get through [the intersection] . . . [i]f I stopped there might be traffic
coming from the left.”).
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drank any alcohol at the party, and how much she had slept the
night before.8
The trial judge found that Churukian was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law, and Churukian appealed to the
Michigan Supreme Court.9 Although the case was a simple vehicular negligence case—and although the court was faced with
a relatively straightforward issue of contributory negligence—
the case spawned among the justices larger philosophical questions regarding the objectives of legal conflict resolution and the
intersection of those objectives with legal procedure. The court
quoted large swaths of Churukian’s direct and cross-examination and remarked on the parties’ different trial strategies. In
his concurring opinion upholding the trial court’s finding of contributory negligence, Judge Smith noted diametrically opposed
approaches to the same problem. On the one hand, the case demanded consideration of “factors such as visibility, the condition
of the surface of the road, the speed of the . . . automobile, [and]
the width of the intersection,”10 but, as Judge Smith conceded,
“the ultimate question [is] a matter of human judgment, namely,
whether the [defendant’s] car constitute[d] an immediate hazard
to a safe crossing.”11
In light of their legal positions, it is perhaps unsurprising
that the defendant encouraged the tribunal to take a scientific
approach to determining the plaintiff’s contributory negligence,
and the plaintiff preferred an approach in which the tribunal
took her perspective into account and engaged in holistic human
understanding. More broadly, however, the manner in which tribunals take factual findings into account is a hotly contested policy debate among scholars of legal institutional design.12 And depending on an individual’s point of view—whether she
prioritizes the accuracy of the underlying fact finding or the holistic, relational judgments that often accompany it—she might
identify one approach as superior to the other, such that she is
more willing to legitimize tribunals that employ that approach.
8. Id. As an example, the court recounted the following question: “Now,
could you give me an estimate as to how fast your car was traveling at that time
in miles per hour, whether 10 miles an hour or 5 or 15?” Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 838.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective on Voluntary Deference to Authorities, 1 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 323 (1997); see also infra Parts I.A, II.A.
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Legal institutional design involves the development of formal and informal rules, the enforcement characteristics that underlie those rules, and the behavioral norms that foster and
structure repeated interactions between the public and a legal
institution.13 The underlying goal of successful institutional design is the public’s willingness to legitimize decisions rendered
by legal institutions.14 This extends beyond legitimizing the substantive legal rules—and the application of those legal rules to
individual factual disputes—that are embodied in a tribunal’s
legal decisions. It extends to the procedural rules that govern a
tribunal’s decisions, which often exert more influence than do
substantive outcomes on the public’s willingness to legitimize legal institutions.15
The first comprehensive theory of institutional design, visà-vis dispute resolution, appeared in the California Law Review
in 1978. This groundbreaking article—titled A Theory of Procedure and coauthored by psychologist John Thibaut and law professor Laurens Walker—opined that establishing factual truth
and providing justice to litigants are the main objectives of dispute resolution.16 From this guiding principle, they taxonomized
all social disputes as falling primarily into one of two categories:
cognitive conflicts, which prioritize establishing the truth of the
dispute, and conflicts of interest, which prioritize providing a
just allocation of resources between disputing parties.17 They
also taxonomized legal procedures as either inquisitorial, which
prioritizes establishing truth and vests control of the evidence in
a central decision maker, or adversarial, which prioritizes justice

13. See Tom R. Tyler, Psychology and Institutional Design, 4 REV. L. &
ECON. 801 (2008) (explaining the relationship between psychological research
and the concept of institutional legitimacy); see also INKE MATHAUER & GUY
CARRIN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH REPORT (2010), BACKGROUND
PAPER NO. 36: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ORGANIZATIONAL
PRACTICE FOR HEALTH FINANCING PERFORMANCE AND UNIVERSAL COVERAGE,
https://www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/
36Institutional.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCB6-XHKZ].
14. Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or Acting
Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1097 (2014).
15. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 2–3 (1975). For an in-depth discussion, see infra Part II.A.
16. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 541 (1978).
17. Id. at 543–44. See also infra Part I.A.2 for an in-depth analysis.
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and allocates substantial control over the evidence to the disputing parties.18 Although Thibaut and Walker do not overtly discuss their theory in terms of institutional legitimacy, they argue
that “purely scientific” disputes—which they deem “cognitive
conflicts”—should be resolved inquisitorially in the administrative arena, whereas all legal cases—which they deem “conflicts
of interest”—should be resolved in trials that follow adversarial
dispute resolution procedures.19
Thibaut and Walker’s influential theory of institutional design has been cited in over 100 law review articles and in several
important treatises.20 Yet in the four decades since they published their theory, no one has directly tested whether the public
does, in fact, categorize legal cases as cognitive conflicts or conflicts of interest, whether the public believes that inquisitorial
procedures prioritize the establishment of truth (and adversarial
procedures prioritize justice), or whether the public believes that
truth and justice are, in fact, the ultimate goals of legal dispute
resolution. Moreover, advances in the field of social psychology—
including social identity theory and the group-value model of intergroup dynamics21—suggest that dichotomizing legal disputes
and legal procedures does not fully capture: (1) the public’s beliefs about the values inherent in those cases and procedures;
and (2) the conditions under which the public is willing to legitimize those procedures and the legal institutions that employ
them.
18. Id. at 555; see also FREDERICK BEUTEL, DEMOCRACY OR THE SCIENTIFIC
METHOD IN LAW AND POLICY MAKING (1965) (opining on the suitability of these
procedures for scientific discourse).
19. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 554–59.
20. A citation count in the legal search engine WestlawNextTM reveals that
Thibaut and Walker’s article has been cited in 122 varied legal academic works,
including articles in the Yale Law Journal and Harvard Law Review, and in
treatises such as DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 2.27 (2019–2020 ed. 2019) and
DEMONTHENES LORANDOS & TERENCE CAMPBELL, CROSS EXAMINING EXPERTS
IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES §§ 1:10, 11:2 (2019). A citation count in the academic search engine Google ScholarTM reveals an additional fifty-four citations
outside the law review literature, including citations in the prestigious Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology and in several interdisciplinary works. See,
e.g., CLYDE H. COOMBS & GEORGE S. AVRUNIN, THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT
235 (1988); Tyler, supra note 12, at 326.
21. See Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior, 13 SOC. SCI.
INFO. 65 (1974); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority
in Groups, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992). For further
discussion of these concepts, see infra Part II.B.2.
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This Article fills that gap. It proposes an updated, complementary model of procedural and institutional legitimacy that
focuses on the social psychological concept of relationality. In doing so, it is the first Article to test empirically the central claims
of A Theory of Procedure and expand upon the theory in critical
ways. For example, it proposes rethinking Thibaut and Walker’s
dichotomy of disputes and procedures and reimagining them as
falling on a relationality continuum—such that disputes that
center on factual uncertainty are lower in relationality, and disputes that primarily require fact finders to make relational comparisons (such as evaluating alleged negligent behavior against
a reasonable person standard) are higher in relationality. In so
doing, this Article challenges Thibaut and Walker’s assertion
that all legal cases, as opposed to disputes regarding scientific
principles, are “conflicts of interest” that should be resolved adversarially.
This Article reports several findings from three original experiments. First, it confirms that the public views the objectives
of legal dispute resolution as resolving questions of factual truth
as well as procedural and distributive justice.22 Second, it
demonstrates that the public does not perceive all legal cases as
concerned primarily with questions of justice. Rather, the public
perceives disputes low in relationality (such as “whodunit” murder cases) as far more concerned with questions of truth than of
justice, and vice versa for disputes high in relationality.23 Moreover, differences in perceived relationality extend to the phases
of a legal trial as well; the public perceives the liability phase as
primarily concerned with truth, and the punishment phase as
primarily concerned with the just allocation of resources.24 The
second study reports that the public believes that different legal
procedures prioritize different psychological values; they perceive adversarial procedures as concerned primarily with procedural justice and inquisitorial procedures as concerned with factual accuracy.25 Finally, the third study suggests that an
alignment of the dispute’s purpose and the priority of the procedure that resolves it—for example, a dispute centering on factual
accuracy paired with an inquisitorial procedure—results in

22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
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greater public willingness to legitimize the legal tribunal and its
ultimate decision.26
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part I provides an
overview of the arguments in Thibaut and Walker’s article, A
Theory of Procedure. Part II provides the framework for a relational model of procedure and its implications for institutional
legitimacy. This Part incorporates insights from social identity
theory and legal psychologist Tom Tyler’s group-value model to
understand the circumstances under which the public is most
likely to legitimize legal institutions. Part III tests Thibaut and
Walker’s theory—alongside the relational model of institutional
legitimacy—by presenting the results from three original experiments that suggest that institutional legitimacy results from an
alignment of the relational goals of the legal proceeding and the
relational priorities of the procedure that resolves the dispute.
Part IV explores the policy implications of these findings, their
limitations, and future directions for legal institutional design.
I. “A THEORY OF PROCEDURE”
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the main arguments for legal institutional design advanced in Thibaut and
Walker’s article, A Theory of Procedure. In describing their theory, this Part discusses the historical backdrop on which the theory rests, as well as the theory’s implications and limitations.
A. THIBAUT AND WALKER’S THEORY
The 1960s was a time for upheaval with respect to politics,
social mores, and even public scientific discourse. In the latter
part of the decade, there was growing discontent that the public
discussion regarding matters of scientific inquiry and public policy was becoming increasingly politicized.27 In response, several
models for a “science court,” which purported to reduce political
interference with respect to questions of science relevant to public policy, were introduced.28 These models had several forms,
but they were concerned primarily with unmooring questions of
26. See infra Part III.C.
27. See Allan Mazur, The Science Court: Reminiscence and Retrospective, 4
RISK 161, 161–62 (1993).
28. See, e.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63
AM. SCI. 505 (1975) [hereinafter Kantrowitz, Controlling Tech]; Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156 SCI. 763 (1967)
[hereinafter Kantrowitz, Proposal]; John Noble Wilford, Science Considers Its
Own ‘Court,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1976, at E8.
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objective scientific fact from political biases.29 Although the models varied with respect to the methods for achieving this objective, many of the proposals focused on the selection of triers with
substantial expertise in the area of relevant scientific inquiry. A
significant point of contention, however, was whether the “court”
should be held in the political arena with quasi-administrative
hearings, or in the courthouse in the form of quasi-adversarial
hearings.30 Although the concept of the science court, whatever
its form, was met with initial enthusiasm from the legislative
and executive branches, it ultimately failed to gain traction.31

29. See Kantrowitz, Proposal, supra note 28, at 763–64; see also Troyen A.
Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law
Courts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 62–71 (1989); William V. Luneburg & Mark A.
Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV.
887, 908 (1981).
30. See Kantrowitz, Controlling Tech, supra note 28, at 507. For a more indepth discussion of the “science court” debates, see Andrew W. Jurs, Science
Court: Past Proposals, Current Considerations, and a Suggested Structure, 15
VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2010); Justin Sevier, Redesigning the Science Court, 73 MD.
L. REV. 770 (2014).
31. See Wilford, supra note 28. For example, and as I have written in Redesigning the Science Court:
Kantrowitz’s proposal enjoyed political momentum in the period
before the election of 1976. President Ford supported the proposal and
his administration created a task force to evaluate the proposal further. This task force released a favorable interim report, made recommendations to refine the proposal, and announced its intention to convene a public hearing on the science court, in which legal and scientific
policymakers could comment on the proposal more fully.
In the fall of 1976, just two months before the presidential election,
the task force convened a contentious public hearing in Leesburg, Virginia. Among the various suggestions from the participants was the
need for a “test case” to examine the viability of a political science court.
That may have been, however, all upon which the participants agreed.
Significant criticisms of the political science court emerged ranging
from the philosophical—for example, doubt that objective scientific
facts could really be separated from sociopolitical questions of morality,
and a concern that providing “finality” to scientific disputes is anathema to the scientific method—to the practical—for example, a concern
that incorporating cross-examination would increase expenses and interfere with the process of determining the “true” scientific facts.
Bluntly, critics of the political science court labeled it “profoundly naïve, internally inconsistent, and inherently unworkable.”
Despite the proposal’s broad-based support, as the 1976 presidential election passed and the Ford Administration gave way to President
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It was against this cultural and political background that
psychologist John Thibaut and law professor Laurens Walker
proffered a new theory of conflict resolution. In A Theory of Procedure, which they published in the California Law Review in
1978, Thibaut and Walker advocated for the development of a
political forum to evaluate questions of scientific inquiry separate from the resolution of legal disputes in the courtroom.32
Their theory differed markedly from the previous “science court”
proposals of the 1960s and 1970s in an important way: it relied
almost entirely on a developing body of empirical social science
research applied in the context of the legal system. Perhaps most
controversially—and as the title of their article suggests—they
argued that the success of any program of institutional design
rests not just on the substantive rules and incentives that the
program creates, but also on the specifics of the procedures that
are used to effectuate those rules and incentives.33 So whereas
the political and judicial science court proposals focused primarily on characteristics of the decision maker itself—such as the
tribunal’s specialized expertise—Thibaut and Walker’s theory
focused instead on the values inherent in the process by which a
dispute is resolved.34
Thibaut and Walker proffer three arguments in service of
their broad theory of effective conflict resolution. They begin by
“recogniz[ing] the fundamental dichotomy between the potential
dispute resolution objectives of ‘truth’ and ‘justice.’”35 They define the truth objective as the ability of the legal tribunal to unearth correctly the facts that underlie the dispute.36 They define
the justice objective as both distributive—the extent to which the
James Carter’s Administration, political winds shifted against the political “science court.” The Carter Administration was much less enthusiastic about the proposal, and the test case for the proposal never materialized. As quickly as it began, the political “science court”
experiment had ended.
Sevier, supra note 30, at 788–89 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Allan Mazur,
The Science Court: Reminiscence & Retrospective, 4 RISK 161, 163–65 (1993);
then citing Jurs, supra note 30, at 12; and then citing Wilford, supra note 28).
32. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16.
33. Id. at 565–66.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 541; see also id. at 543 (“The theory begins with the distinction
between the two conflict resolution objectives of ‘justice’ and ‘truth.’ We contend
that in most instances one or the other of these objectives is dictated by the
subject matter of the dispute, or more specifically by the outcome relationship
that exists between the individual parties to the conflict.”).
36. Id. at 541–42.
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outcome of the dispute is fair—and procedural, which refers to
the fairness of the process used to resolve the dispute.37 Thibaut
and Walker implicitly argue that truth and justice are related
but distinct goals, and that they may be implicated to differing
degrees in different disputes.38 This claim serves as the lynchpin
of their theory.39
1. Taxonomy of Conflicts
On this central premise, Thibaut and Walker argue that all
disputes—for example, over scientific principles, civil matters,
criminal matters, and administrative actions—can be classified
to the degree that they are differentially focused on the objectives of truth or justice.40 They argue that most disputes can be
dichotomized as either “cognitive conflicts” or “conflicts of interest,” with a small number of disputes classified as “mixed.”41
They argue that “cognitive conflicts” are disputes that focus on
truth, whereas “conflicts of interest” center on justice.42
From Thibaut and Walker’s perspective, the resolution of a
cognitive conflict uniformly enhances the interests and outcomes
of all affected parties, whereas a contrary resolution would uniformly reduce the outcomes for all parties.43 Thus, in a purely
cognitive conflict, all parties seek the correct factual solution to
the issue that caused the dispute. Thibaut and Walker describe
scientific inquiry as “the prototype of cognitive conflict in a setting of common interest,” because the idealized role of the scientist is to uncover truth in a disinterested manner.44
In contrast, Thibaut and Walker argue that all other disputes are “conflicts of interest.” In such disputes, the parties’ in-

37. Id. at 544 (discussing “the proper distribution” of resources between
parties).
38. See id. at 543. This proposition necessarily follows from their argument
and has been partially tested empirically. See Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice
Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 212 (2014).
39. This claim is theoretical, insofar as Thibaut and Walker do not argue
that the public perceives “truth” and “justice” to be the twin aims of conflict resolution. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 543.
40. Id. at 543–44.
41. Id. at 541–42 (proposing a “two-stage procedure” for resolving mixed
disputes).
42. Id. at 543–44.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 543.
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terests are diametrically opposed, because any particular solution will maximize the outcome—and therefore the resource allocation—for one disputant at the expense of another.45 In these
disputes, the parties will not agree that any one solution provided by the decision maker is the “correct” solution; instead, the
quality of the tribunal’s decisions will be judged by the distribution of outcomes among the disputants.46 Thibaut and Walker
argue that civil and criminal litigation comprise the classic “conflict of interest”; patent disputes, disputes over the allocation of
trust or estate assets, and disputes over the identity of the perpetrator of a crime all involve decisions in which either money
flows from one party to another, or where the state and the defendant “seek incompatible outcomes.”47
Thibaut and Walker clarified, however, that cognitive conflicts are not concerned with “truth” to the exclusion of “justice”
concerns, and vice versa with respect to conflicts of interest.48
Rather, the taxonomy turns on the primary objective of these
disputes. Cognitive conflicts are primarily focused on establishing factual truth through which justice is attained as a logical
consequence, but not as a primary consideration.49 Conversely,
conflicts of interests involve predicate factual determinations,
but these are subordinate to the more important objective, which
is the fair allocation of resources among the disputants.50 Thibaut and Walker recognize that there may be a degree of overlap
between cognitive conflicts and conflicts of interest on this dimension.51 Yet they characterize these disputes as rare conflicts

45. Id. at 544.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 544 (discussing these disputes and mentioning others, including
disputes over land).
48. Id. at 544–45.
49. Id. at 545 (noting that “[i]n science, the facts found have an enduring
significance because they guide future conduct”).
50. Id. (“The significance of factual determinations in a legal proceeding
generally ends with the division of outcomes and there is no future reliance on
the cognitive decision.”).
51. Id. at 542.
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of interest that have spillover effects for society beyond the disputants’ distributive outcomes.52 Thibaut and Walker’s taxonomy of conflicts appears in Figure 1 below.53
Figure 1. Thibaut & Walker’s Taxonomy of Conflicts.

2. Taxonomy of Procedures
The final element of Thibaut and Walker’s theory involves
the procedures by which tribunals resolve cognitive conflicts and
conflicts of interest. They view the purpose of procedural rules
as defining and maintaining the roles of the disputant vis-à-vis
the decision-making tribunal in the course of the proceedings.54
Specifically, procedural rules govern the degree of control that
participants exert on the proceedings. Thibaut and Walker argue
that different decision-making procedures can be taxonomized
according to two forms of control that tribunals either afford or
deny disputants.55 They define decision control as the degree to
which the disputants can unilaterally dictate the outcome of the
dispute.56 In contrast, process control refers to the ability of either the disputants or the decision maker to control the development and selection of the information from which the tribunal
will resolve the dispute.57 Process control therefore refers not
52. Id. at 566 (“Finally, certain rare but important decision-making problems involve both cognitive conflict and conflict of interest. For resolving these
disputes, we propose a two-staged procedure that separates questions of truth
from questions of justice and employs an appropriate process for each.”).
53. This illustration originally appeared in A Theory of Procedure. Id. at
560.
54. Id. at 545.
55. Id. at 546.
56. Id.
57. Id. (defining the term as “control over the development and selection of
information that will constitute the basis for resolving the dispute”).
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just to the disputants’ ability to present evidence to the tribunal,
but their control over the investigatory and discovery procedures
as well. The interaction between the degree of decision control
and process control afforded to disputants determines the overall
distribution of control at the proceeding, insofar as reducing the
control exercised by the disputants expands the control exerted
by the tribunal.58
Against this background, Thibaut and Walker argue that, at
their core, there are two major dispute resolution procedures: an
adversarial (disputing) procedure and an inquisitorial (autocratic) procedure.59 These procedures differ markedly in the degree of control that they afford disputants. In the autocratic, inquisitorial model—characteristic of most dispute resolution
tribunals in continental Europe—both decision control and process control are ceded by the disputants to the tribunal.60 A central decision maker (or panel of decision makers) collects the information necessary to resolve the dispute, while hearing from
the disputants at the central decision maker’s whim.61
In the disputing, adversarial model—characteristic of tribunals in the United States, England, and other common law countries—control is split.62 The tribunal retains full decision control
but cedes a substantial degree of process control to the disputants. Although the tribunal—either one decision maker or a
panel of triers—renders the decision, the tribunal does so only
after the disputants investigate the facts underlying the conflict
and present information to the tribunal for consideration.63
These procedural paradigms, according to Thibaut and
Walker, give rise to different priorities vis-à-vis the objectives of
truth and justice in conflict resolution. Vesting both decision and
process control in the hands of a disinterested central decision
maker, as in the inquisitorial procedure, provides the tribunal
with a “single ‘selection strategy’ that will generate information
58. Id. (noting that it “therefore determines the essential character of the
procedures”).
59. Id. at 555–56. Thibaut and Walker recognize substantial nuance in the
space between “pure” adversarial and “pure” inquisitorial dispute resolution
procedures (for example, a “bargaining” procedure that affords disputants total
process and decision control), although it is not directly relevant here. For a
discussion, see id. at 555–59.
60. Id. at 547.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 552.
63. Id.
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appropriate to the inquiry.”64 This strategy (1) increases the likelihood that relevant evidence will be discovered and produced,
and (2) reduces the transaction and agency costs involved in assimilating and tracking that information.65 The inquisitorial
procedure therefore prioritizes the establishment of factual
truth.66

64. Id. at 547 (citing J.S. BRUNER ET AL., A STUDY OF THINKING (1956)).
65. Id. at 548 (“Such a selection strategy increases the likelihood of obtaining the relevant information, reduces the strain of assimilating and tracking
information, and minimizes the risk of failing to reach the correct solution
within a limited number of attempts.”).
66. The existing research, much of it relied upon by Thibaut and Walker,
suggests that the picture is more complex. I have written about this research in
an earlier work, The Truth Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy
and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, and I
reproduce the relevant section here:
Researchers have studied a decision-making procedure’s pursuit of
truth, or decisional accuracy, by examining the objective truth that it
produces and the perceptions of truth that it produces among litigants . . . . Thibaut and Walker hypothesized that the inquisitorial system produces objective truth by vesting control over the flow of evidence with the decision maker. This suggests that the inquisitorial
system produces greater truth than does the adversarial system, in
which biased advocates control the presentation of potentially biased
evidence to the decision maker. A competing hypothesis states, however, that evidence may be vetted more vigorously in the adversarial
system, where motivated advocates cross-examine their adversary’s
witnesses and expose weaknesses in their adversary’s case.
Lind, Thibaut, and Walker tested these competing hypotheses.
[They] asked participants to gather facts—and to transmit those facts
to the court—as either a client-centered, adversarial advocate or as an
unbiased, inquisitorial investigator. The study revealed few differences
in fact-finding diligence between participants in the inquisitorial and
adversarial conditions, but the study revealed substantial differences
in the transmission of facts. Participants in the adversarial condition
transmitted to the court nearly none of the facts they uncovered that
disfavored their client, while participants in the inquisitorial condition
transmitted to the decision maker nearly the same proportion of positive and negative facts that they uncovered. The study suggests that
the adversarial system may shield from the decision maker facts that
are unfavorable to the parties, which in turn may lead to inaccurate
decisions. Other researchers have replicated these findings.
A smaller body of research, however, suggests that the adversarial
system may counteract decisionmaker bias in a manner that the inquisitorial system does not. These researchers hypothesized that inquisitorial decision makers may prematurely characterize a defendant
as guilty if the initial facts of the defendant’s case are similar to the
facts of other cases in which defendants were found guilty. This, in
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The adversarial procedure, however, prioritizes different
ends. Thibaut and Walker argue that procedures that allow the
parties to perform their own investigation into the facts of the
dispute and present those findings to the decision maker provide
the parties with a greater opportunity to influence the outcome
of the dispute.67 Specifically, parties with more information than
the decision maker will be able to produce information from their
own perspective, “with full particularities and contexts.”68 Because the information comes from self-interested disputants,
however, it runs the risk of bias.69
Nonetheless, the ability to control the flow of information to
the decision maker—and to ultimately shape the outcome of the
dispute—leads to increased perceptions that the dispute was resolved fairly, which is a central tenet of the justice objective of
conflict resolution.70

turn, may lead to the biased assimilation of facts in the current defendant’s case. Thibaut et al. tested this hypothesis by varying (a) the information about prior cases that was given to the decision maker and
(b) the type of procedure used to evaluate the dispute. The researchers
found that judgments of decision makers in the inquisitorial condition
were influenced by the outcomes of similar prior cases, whereas the
judgments of decision makers in the adversarial condition were not.
Thibaut et al. concluded that at least one aspect of the adversarial system reduces bias better than does the inquisitorial system.
Sevier, supra note 38, at 212–13 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted) (first
citing Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16; then citing THIBAUT & WALKER, supra
note 15; then citing ROSENBERG ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1975);
then citing E. Allen Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L REV. 1129 (1973); then citing Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial Evidence: Effects of Lawyer’s Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320 (1980); then citing E. Allan Lind & Laurens
Walker, Theory Testing, Theory Development, and Laboratory Research on Legal Issues, 3 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 5–18 (1979); and then citing John Thibaut et
al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV.
386, 386–401 (1972)).
67. Thibaut and Walker, supra note 16, at 548–52.
68. Id. at 551.
69. Id. at 558–59.
70. Social psychologists have defined the justice afforded by decision-making procedures as the perception among people that the decision-making process
itself is fair and equitable. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 15; see also E.
ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (Melvin J. Lerner ed., 1988). See generally Craig A. Wendorf et al., Social
Justice and Moral Reasoning: An Empirical Integration of Two Paradigms in
Psychological Research, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 19 (2002) (elaborating on two para-
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND GAPS
Based on these assertions, Thibaut and Walker make several recommendations for effective conflict resolution and legal
reform. Their central claim is that scientific inquiry, a purely
digms of “theoretical and empirical work regarding the concept of justice”). Researchers have found that the decision maker’s neutrality, the degree of respect
that the decision maker confers on the parties, the amount of voice and control
that the parties have over the legal dispute, and the degree to which parties can
trust the decision maker’s motive to be fair influence people’s perceptions of
procedural justice. LIND & TYLER, supra.
As I have written earlier in The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of
Decisional Accuracy and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems:
If perceptions of procedural justice are determined, in part, by the
amount of voice and control that the decision maker affords litigants,
the adversarial model—which affords litigants more control over the
proceedings than does a pure inquisitorial model—should be perceived
as more just. To the extent that heightened perceptions of procedural
justice lead to greater preferences for a procedure, a body of research
supports this hypothesis. In their earlier work, Thibaut and Walker
found that, controlling for the outcome of a legal dispute, people generally report higher preferences for adversarial procedures compared
with inquisitorial procedures. Other researchers have found similar effects.
A smaller body of research, however, suggests that the adversarial
system might not always be perceived as more just than the inquisitorial procedure. [Researchers] Anderson and Otto found cultural differences with respect to litigants’ perceptions of procedural fairness. Although Americans preferred the adversarial system and perceived it to
be fairer than the inquisitorial system, Dutch participants preferred
the inquisitorial system and perceived it to be fairer than the adversarial system. Furthermore, [researchers] Austin and Tobiasen have
found that inquisitorial procedures are perceived as just as fair as adversarial procedures if participants believe that the procedures are implemented reasonably.
Sevier, supra note 38, at 213 (footnotes omitted) (first citing THIBAUT &
WALKER, supra note 15; then citing Pauline Houlden et al., Preference for Modes
of Dispute Resolution as a Function of Process and Decision Control, 14 J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 13 (1978); then citing Stephen LaTour, et al., Some Determinants of Preference for Modes of Conflict Resolution, 20 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
319 (1976); then citing L. Walker et al., Reactions to Participants and Observers
to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 295, 295–310 (1974); then
citing R. A. Anderson & A. L. Otto, Perceptions of Fairness in the Justice System:
A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 31 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 557, 557–63
(2003); then citing William Austin & Joyce M. Tobiasen, Legal Justice and the
Psychology of Conflict Resolution, in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 227–74 (Robert
Folger ed., 1984); and then citing N.J. Brekke at al., Of Juries and Court-Appointed Experts: The Impact of Nonadversarial Versus Adversarial Expert Testimony, 15 L. HUM. BEHAV. 451, 451–75 (1991)).

2020]

[RELATIONAL] THEORY OF PROCEDURE

2003

“cognitive conflict” concerned ultimately with questions of truth,
is unsuitable for the adversarial legal system and should be resolved by an inquisitorial administrative body.71 All other disputes—including all legal disputes—are conflicts of interest that
are concerned predominantly with questions of justice.72 These
disputes should therefore be resolved through adversarial procedures.73
Thibaut and Walker’s policy recommendations have proven
influential, insofar as A Theory of Procedure has been cited by
myriad scholars and policymakers.74 But they are also subject to
significant limitations. Most importantly, although Thibaut and
Walker’s theory speaks to questions of institutional design, it is
not a theory of institutional legitimacy. As discussed in more detail, infra, psychological legitimacy is based on public perceptions
of the values embodied in substantive and procedural legal
rules.75 And although Thibaut and Walker base the principles of
their theory on empirical social science, in the four decades since
they published their article, no one has tested empirically
(1) what the public believes to be the objectives of conflict resolution, (2) whether the public sees different types of cases as implicating different conflict resolution objectives, and (3) whether
the public perceives legal procedures as prioritizing these objectives differently.76
In fact, there are several reasons to believe that Thibaut and
Walker’s taxonomy of cases and procedures does not capture
fully the public’s attitudes toward different conflict resolution
procedures and the extent to which the public is willing to legitimize them. As this Article discusses below, by framing their theory in terms of the “science court” debate, Thibaut and Walker
classify all non-scientific disputes as conflicts of interest subject
71. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16.
72. Id. at 557–58.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and
the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78, 78 (2014) (“The empirical study of
legitimacy has demonstrated that when authorities are viewed as legitimate
they are better able to motivate people to comply with the law.”); see also infra
Part II.A.
76. Although a handful of researchers have indirectly tested certain aspects
of Thibaut and Walker’s theory, see, e.g., Sevier, supra note 38 and accompanying text, no one has comprehensively tested the theory in the context of its implications for institutional legitimacy.
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to adversarial legal resolution.77 But there are reasons to believe—based on recent social psychological research on social
identity theory and the group-value model—that the public does
not perceive all legal disputes as conflicts of interest concerned
primarily with questions of justice.78 Rather, there likely is substantial variation among the public with respect to the perceived
objectives of different legal cases. If so, policymakers may need
to reevaluate the axiom that all legal disputes should be resolved
adversarially.
II. A RELATIONAL THEORY OF PROCEDURE
The following section reframes Thibaut and Walker’s theory
to more accurately reflect the public’s perceptions of the aims of
legal conflict resolution and the means by which disputes are resolved, in an effort to articulate a comprehensive theory of institutional legitimacy. It does so by focusing on the psychological
concept of relationality. This expanded theory yields a more complete picture of the conditions under which the public legitimizes
different conflict resolution procedures.
A. INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
Institutional legitimacy is an amorphous concept with implications for all aspects of an individual’s life, specifically with
respect to the manner in which she is governed by those in
power.79 I have written in detail elsewhere regarding the phenomenon’s scholarly origins:
Legitimacy as a political theory has its roots at least as far back as
the Enlightenment, when moral philosopher John Locke famously
opined that “the government is not legitimate unless it is carried on
with the consent of the governed.”
[Building on this axiom,] political theorists describe the concept of
[institutional] legitimacy as the status and acceptance that governed
people confer onto their governors’ institutions and conduct based on
the belief that those actions constitute an appropriate use of power.

77. See infra Part II.
78. See Tajfel, supra note 21; Tyler & Lind, supra note 21; see also infra
Part II.B.
79. See Justin Sevier, Evidentiary Trapdoors, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1155, 1195
(2018) (introducing a “behavioral model regarding the effects of trapdoor evidence on the courts’ institutional legitimacy”); see also JOHN R. SCHERMERHORN
ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Lisé Johnson ed., 12th ed. 2011) (discussing “interactional justice” between social actors); CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND
LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2004) (discussing governmental legitimacy).
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According to German sociologist Max Weber, the governed confer legitimacy onto legal actors via an alignment of values between the political
actors and the governed—that is, through public trust that the government will act in the interests of the governed—and not through the
government’s coercion or force. Therefore, to the extent that a misalignment develops between the values of the governed and the actions
of the government, political [and institutional] legitimacy is endangered.80

Legitimacy is therefore an important extension of institutional design, insofar as it is based on the public’s attitudes toward a governing body and extends to the public’s willingness to
abide by the governing body’s decisions.81 As, again, I have written elsewhere:
Numerous interdisciplinary scholars have attempted to explain the
theories that underlie people’s willingness to legitimize governmental
action. Broadly speaking, these theories fall into two camps. The first
camp is often referred to as “output,” “instrumental,” or “goal-attainment” legitimacy. This theory posits that legitimacy is derived almost
entirely from substantive outcomes for either society at large or, more
specifically, for the individuals affected by governmental action. Thus,
under this theory legitimacy is a function of social exchange, insofar as
exchanges and interactions with governmental actors resulting in a
positive distribution of goods to the governed create a greater willingness among the governed to legitimize the governmental action.
In contrast, a second theory of psychological legitimacy is referred
to as “substantive” or “relational” legitimacy. In contrast to the instrumental, goal-oriented model, this model posits a relational, equitybased manner in which governmental actors attain popular [and institutional] legitimacy. The theory posits that a government attains legitimacy through its procedural responsiveness to the concerns of its citizens by allowing them to meaningfully participate in the governmental
process.82
80. Sevier, supra note 79, at 1169–70 (footnotes omitted) (first citing JOHN
LOCKE: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 524 (R. Ashcraft ed., 1991); then citing JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 135 (1971) (discussing a similar theory of legitimacy); then citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 80 (1986); then citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 29 (2006); then citing MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 79
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds., 1991); then citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 121 (1993) (suggesting “that political institutions that lack legitimacy exercise their power unjustifiably and will not be obeyed”); and then citing
THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 15, at 7). Weber’s idea that the governed confer
legitimacy via an alignment of values is also sometimes referred to as “civil legitimacy.” Id. at 1170 n.71.
81. See Tyler & Jackson, supra note 75.
82. Sevier, supra note 79, at 1170 (footnotes omitted) (first citing THIBAUT
& WALKER, supra note 15, at 7 (theorizing that people view as legitimate governmental actions those that are instrumental to the individual’s attainment of
social goods); then citing Florian Weigand, Investigating the Role of Legitimacy
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That theory has attained empirical support in the form of legal psychologist Tom R. Tyler’s group-value model.83 As Professor Tyler and I have explained:
The relational [group-value] model of legitimacy argues that people
value the [governmental actor’s] use of fair procedures because those
procedures carry messages of status and inclusion which reinforce people’s identification with legal institutions and authorities and support
their feelings of inclusion and status in the community. This then leads
to high self-worth and favorable self-esteem. When people can present
their concerns to judicial authorities and feel that those authorities
consider and take account of their concerns, people’s identification with
law and legal authorities is strengthened.84

In light of the modern social science research on institutional
legitimacy, this Article proffers a new theory of procedure that
incorporates as its central feature the psychological concept of
relationality. It argues that psychological relationality as a conceptual framework has important ripple effects for the way the
public classifies legal cases and gauges the priorities of the procedures that resolve those cases.
B. RELATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
The concept of relationality refers to the degree to which
people evaluate their own behaviors, and the behaviors of those
with whom they interact, in the context of their relationships
with others.85 Put simply, an individual’s appraisals of another’s
in the Political Order of Conflict-Torn Spaces (London Sch. of Econ. & Political
Sci., Working Paper No. 04, 2015); then citing Tyler, supra note 12, at 325; and
then citing Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 123, 126–27 (2008)). For a succinct summary, see Justin Sevier, Legitimizing
Character Evidence, 68 EMORY L.J. 441, 456–57 (2019).
83. Sevier, supra note 79, at 1171 (citing Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of
Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 830 (1989) (conducting experiments and finding that the neutrality
of the decision-making process, trust in the decision maker, and the information
conveyed to an individual regarding her social standing influence perceptions
of governmental legitimacy)). Other researchers have replicated these effects.
Id. at 1171 n.76 (citing Heather J. Smith et al., The Self-Relevant Implications
of the Group-Value Model: Group Membership, Self-Worth, and Treatment Quality, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 470 (1998); Fatima H. Sousa & Jorge
Vala, Relational Justice in Organizations: The Group-Value Model and Support
for Change, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 99 (2002)).
84. Tyler & Sevier, supra note 14, at 1097.
85. See, e.g., Tyler & Lind, supra note 21 (categorizing relational models as
those that “focus on relationship issues, especially perceptions of the relationship between the authority and those subject to his or her decision”); see also
Ian Tucker, Psychology as Space: Embodied Relationality, 5 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 231, 231–38 (2011) (borrowing from notions of biological
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attitudes and behaviors do not occur in a vacuum; people actively—both consciously and outside of conscious awareness—
seek to understand the relational context in which behavior occurs.86 Although psychologists disagree regarding how successfully people are able to integrate contextual factors into their appraisal of an individual’s behavior, there is little disagreement
that these relational calculations occur.87 Indeed, empirical research suggests that people are especially sensitive to relational
equities and inequities in their interactions with others in their
social environment, including authority figures.88 Social scientists argue that relationality in the context of equity and fairness
is a guiding principle for how people view actors in their social
environment.89 Others further argue that these judgments extend to people’s willingness to legitimize the institutions that
govern them.90 Although several theories have been proffered for
understanding how individuals evaluate intergroup relations,91
“space” and reconceptualizing areas of social psychology as instantiations of the
relational “space” between individuals).
86. See, e.g., Tyler & Lind, supra note 21.
87. Compare Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings:
Distortions in the Attribution Process, in ADVANCED EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 173, 184 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 10th ed. 1977) (discussing the
“fundamental attribution error” in which people insufficiently adjust for contextual factors that contribute to behavior), with Bill D. Bell & Gary G. Stanfield,
An Interactionist Appraisal of Impression Formation: The “Central Trait” Hypothesis Revisited, 9 KAN. J. SOC. 55, 63 (1973) (stating the conditions under
which people are more likely to take relational considerations into account when
evaluating human behavior). For a succinct review of this issue, see Sevier, supra note 82, at 458–64.
88. Psychologists Kirschner & Martin have summed up this research this
way: “Indeed, a long line of Anglo-American and Continental thinkers have held
that our social relations with others have primacy with respect to our psychological existence, being an indispensably necessary source for our thinking
about the world and ourselves.” THE SOCIOCULTURAL TURN IN PSYCHOLOGY:
THE CONTEXTUAL EMERGENCE OF MIND AND SELF 3 (Suzanne R. Kirschner &
Jack Martin eds., 2010).
89. See, e.g., Tom Tyler at al., Understanding Why the Justice of Group Procedures Matters: A Test of the Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value
Model, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 913, 914–15 (1996) (discussing the
“group-value model” of social interaction and explaining the psychological signals sent to group members when they deem interactions as fair).
90. See Tyler & Sevier, supra note 14 at 1117–30 (testing two models of
legitimacy and finding support for a model of legitimacy based on the social signals produced by a tribunal’s procedures).
91. The most well-known of the early theories of intergroup relations was
social exchange theory, which posits that people view their societal interactions
as a means through which they can maximize the social and economic benefits
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the dominant explanation stems from social identity theory in
social psychology.92
Social identity theory posits that an individual’s relevant social group has a direct, measurable impact on an individual’s
self-concept and her assessments of others in her social environment.93 Social identity theorists hypothesize that social relationships primarily are governed not by what is the most economically beneficial outcome to the parties, but instead by what will
lead to the best psychological self-concept for partners to the exchange.94 This self-concept is often governed by the individual’s
group membership.95 At the heart of social identity theory is the
notion that people are intrinsically motivated, both consciously
and unconsciously, to achieve a state of positive self-distinctiveness, or positive self-identity.96 They typically judge themselves
and others through a series of social comparisons between themselves and a target actor in their environment.97 To the extent
while minimizing losses and costs. See, e.g., Karen S. Cook & Richard M. Emerson, Power, Equity and Commitment in Exchange Networks, 43 AM. SOC. REV.
721 (1978); see also George C. Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AM. J.
SOC. 597 (1958). In studies that test the tenets of social exchange theory, researchers focus on variables such as the individual’s degree of self-interest, degree of interdependence, and cognitive appraisals of gains and losses. For a review, see Edward J. Lawler & Shane R. Thye, Bringing Emotion into Social
Exchange Theory, 25 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 217 (1999). One of the principal
criticisms of traditional social exchange theory is that it characterizes social interactions and personal dynamics in a manner that is artificially transactional.
See Edward J. Lawler, An Affect Theory of Social Exchange, 107 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 321 (2001).
92. See MICHAEL A. HOGG & DOMINIC ABRAMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS: A
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES
(1988); ELAINE WALSTER ET AL., EQUITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH (1978).
93. John C. Turner & Penelope J. Oakes, The Significance of the Social
Identity Concept for Social Psychology with Reference to Individualism, Interactionism and Social Influence, 25 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 240–41 (1986).
Self-identity is based on an individual’s membership in various social groups;
thus a person possesses multiple identities that are adopted and used based on
situational factors. Id.
94. See, e.g., Tyler & Lind, supra note 21.
95. Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup
Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33–47 (W.G.
Austin & S. Worchel eds., 1979).
96. See generally S. ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS:
THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH 26–56 (1st ed. 2001).
97. Social comparison theory, a highly influential concept in social psychology, was first introduced by Leon Festinger in 1954. The theory centers on the
belief that social beings seek to gain information bearing on their self-valuations. Festinger hypothesized that individuals do so by explicitly or implicitly

2020]

[RELATIONAL] THEORY OF PROCEDURE

2009

that a person’s self-perception is linked to her social identity
among others in her environment, one hypothesis for explaining
how individuals achieve positive self-distinctiveness suggests a
direct link between positive self-distinctiveness and positive selfesteem, such that the nature of a person’s group status in the
relevant social hierarchy, as well as her status within that social
group, can positively and negatively affect the polarity of her social identity.98
Thus, social identity models predict that interactions that
leave people believing that they are not valued within their social group, or that the social group with which they identify is
not valued by a decision maker, will affect their perceptions of
the fairness and value of that social interaction.99 Although this
model of intergroup interaction is not orthogonal to the economic
outcomes that people receive during their exchange transactions
with others, the social identity model focuses primarily on the
subjective psychological states of the actors to the exchange.100
In so doing, this model of intergroup relations moves away from
purely “cold” cognitive calculations of expected utility and focuses on “warmer” cognition associated with, among other psychological constructs, dignity and respect.101
Perhaps most importantly, social identity theory explicitly
accepts as its premise for societal interaction that group members consistently evaluate interactions with others in their environment through the lens of relationality. This has several implications for the continuing applicability of Thibaut and
Walker’s A Theory of Procedure. As the next sections demonstrate, relationality manifests itself (1) in the concept of intersubjectivity with respect to the classification of legal conflicts,
and (2) in the concept of the group-value model with respect to
the classification of legal procedures. Under this framework, we
can reimagine Thibaut and Walker’s taxonomy of cases and procedures as placing different types of disputes and procedures on
a continuum based on the extent to which these disputes and
comparing themselves to others in their environment to reduce uncertainty
about their own social standing and to receive information relevant to their selfconcept. See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM.
REL. 117 (1954). Social comparison processes have complex consequences for
ethnocentrism, in-group favoritism, stereotyping, and conformity behaviors. Id.
98. Tajfel & Turner, supra note 95, at 33–47.
99. See, e.g., Tyler & Lind, supra note 21.
100. Tajfel & Turner, supra note 95, at 33–47.
101. For a review, see HOGG & ABRAMS, supra note 92.
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procedures foster—or decline to foster—the use of relational
comparisons by the public.
1. The Relationality of Conflicts
In the context of the judgments we make about others in our
environment, the concept of relationality can be traced to German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s “hermeneutic circle.”102
Heidegger argued, in the context of textual interpretation, that
neither the whole of an ancient text nor any individual part can
be understood without reference to the other.103 Thus, pure textual interpretation is impossible without situating the text in its
literary, historical, or cultural context.104
This hermeneutic approach to relationality was expanded
upon most famously by sociologist Max Weber105 and manifests
itself in the psychological concept of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity has been conceptualized in different ways,106 but it is
widely understood as the manner in which we explain and predict others’ behavior by imagining what our mental states would
be, and how we would behave, if we were in their situation.107
More specifically, we simulate the target’s mental states to understand the cause of the observed behavior, and then use the
simulated mental states as input for our decision-making.108 We
then take the resulting conclusion and attribute it to the target.109

102. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 352 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., Harper & Row 1962).
103. Id. But cf. Georgia Warnke, The Hermeneutic Circle Versus Dialogue,
65 REV. METAPHYSICS 91 (2011) (critiquing the concept).
104. Warnke, supra note 103.
105. See MAX WEBER, GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE ZUR WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE
(1922).
106. For examples of different approaches, see EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, SOCIAL
MINDSCAPES: AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SOCIOLOGY (1997) (discussing intersubjectivity in the context of “thought communities”); Hanne De Jaegher et
al., Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition?, 14 TRENDS COGNITIVE
SCI. 441 (2010) (discussing an “interactive turn in social cognition research”);
Shannon Spaulding, Introduction to Debates on Social Cognition, 11 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 431 (2012) (discussing a “theory theory” approach to
intersubjectivity).
107. Spaulding, supra note 106, at 433. For a neuroscientific view of intersubjectivity, see Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia, What Is So Special
About Embodied Simulation?, 15 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 512 (2011).
108. Gallese & Sinigaglia, supra note 107.
109. Id.
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Applying these principles to the classification of human conflicts sheds light on the limitations of Thibaut and Walker’s approach. Their claim that all questions of science comprise cognitive conflicts and all legal questions comprise conflicts of interest
fails to meaningfully distinguish between different types of legal
disputes. For example, a classic “whodunit” murder trial attempts to resolve the same primary question as a purely scientific inquiry: the unbiased development of facts. In neither
case—either the temperature at which dry ice sublimates or the
identity of an assault victim’s attacker—does the ultimate determination rest on a subjective, relational judgment by the fact
finder; rather, the primary question is the search for objective
truth. Thus, although Thibaut and Walker may be correct that
even a “whodunit” conflict creates a zero-sum game between the
government and the defendant in a manner that normally is not
true with respect to adversaries in a scientific dispute,110 the
non-relational question at the heart of both disputes is similar.
In contrast, other cases require a greater degree of intersubjectivity, and therefore are more relational. For example, civil
and criminal fact finders frequently must determine whether a
defendant’s admitted actions meet a psychologically subjective
standard, such as the actions of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances surrounding the conflict.111 Of course, the
underlying fact finding is still important, insofar as the tribunal
must have information regarding the actions that the defendant
took that bear on the question of reasonableness. But these cases
require the tribunal to make the type of relational comparisons
that form the basis of social identity theory and intersubjectivity.
The fact finder must decide, in reference to the abstract, reasonable person—and in practice, in reference to one’s idealized selfimage112—whether the target’s behavior conformed to in-group
norms, such that the target is relieved of legal responsibility for
110. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 544 (“Criminal litigation also
involves a conflict of interest, because the prosecutor (as surrogate for society)
and the defendant seek incompatible outcomes.”).
111. Although the inquiry as a formal legal matter is framed as an objective
one, reasonable people can and frequently do differ on whether civil or criminal
defendants meet the standard. This suggests that, at least from a psychological
perspective, the determination is more subjective than formal legal doctrines
imply.
112. See, e.g., Richard L. Wiener et al., Social Analytic Investigation of Hostile Work Environments: A Test of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 19 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 263 (1995) (examining the processes by which jurors evaluate the
reasonable person standard in tort law).
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the consequences of her actions. As in questions of intersubjectivity and social identity theory outside the legal context, these
comparisons frequently involve questions of equity and fairness113—reframed in legal terms: justice.114
Thus, we can reformulate Thibaut and Walker’s dichotomy
of scientific cognitive conflicts and legal conflicts of interest
along a relationality continuum, whereby non-relational quests
for objective facts fall along the left side of the continuum and
relational conflicts that invite social comparison fall along the
right side. A simplified sketch of this continuum appears in Figure 2 below.115
Figure 2. Relationality Continuum of Legal Conflicts.

Interestingly, if relationality is a guiding principle by which
the public evaluates the objectives of different legal disputes, another hypothesis emerges. We could extend this theory not just
to different types of cases—as Thibaut and Walker did—but also
to different phases of a trial. Specifically, the public may perceive
the liability phase of a trial as meaningfully different from the
punishment phase with respect to the degree of relationality
that is present. The liability phase—whether it is a whodunit
murder trial or a civil negligence trial—requires the fact finder
to reach a binary decision: either guilty or not guilty (or liable or
non-liable in the civil context). In contrast, the punishment
phase requires the tribunal to make a more subjective judgment:
the extent of the restitution that would make the plaintiff or society whole. Scholars have noted that these judgments implicitly
involve notions of fairness, as opposed to “accuracy,”116 and these

113. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 83.
114. See Tyler & Sevier, supra note 14, at 1095.
115. For a robust discussion of this relationality continuum, see infra notes
125–30 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and
the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419 (2003) (discussing the
concept in the context of victim impact statements).
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fairness judgments are often reached after hearing from witnesses who explain the harm the defendant inflicted on the victim in the context of the relationship between the witness and
the victim.117 This Article therefore predicts that the public perceives the liability phase of a trial as primarily concerned with
questions of truth, whereas the public perceives the punishment
phase as focusing on justice.
2. The Relationality of Procedures
This Article applies the relationality framework to reimagine Thibaut and Walker’s classification of decision-making procedures. In this domain, relationality manifests itself in the concept of the group-value model,118 first proposed by legal
psychologist Tom R. Tyler, which distinguishes among conflict
resolution procedures that have autocratic elements and those
that have adversarial elements.
Initially, social science research on the public’s perceptions
of legal dispute resolution procedures focused solely on the outcomes that the procedures produced.119 Later research, however,
suggested that the public’s attitudes toward legal tribunals were
more complex; they also depended on the process by which those
decisions were reached.120 This phenomenon, termed “procedural justice,” posits that people’s perceptions of the justice afforded to them in a social transaction are shaped in part by their
subjective evaluations of the fairness of the procedures used to
allocate resources.121
117. See id.
118. LIND & TYLER, supra note 70.
119. This phenomenon is termed “distributive justice.” See John T. Jost &
Aaron C. Kay, Social Justice: History, Theory, and Research, in HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010); see also J. Stacy
Adams, Inequality in Social Exchange, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 267–99 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965).
120. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 15; see also LIND & TYLER, supra
note 70.
121. See Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders:
Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
72 (1985); Tom Tyler & David Markell, The Public Regulation of Land Use Decisions: Criteria for Evaluating Alternative Procedures, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 538, 541 (2010) (“[P]eople’s reactions to their experiences with legal authorities are strongly shaped by their subjective evaluations of the justice of the
procedures used to resolve their case.”). The phenomenon has been demonstrated in a vast array of contexts, including legal adjudication, alternative dispute resolution, interactions with the police, the workplace, and in the family.
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The dominant model for explaining the effect of the decisionmaking process on an institution’s perceived legitimacy is rooted
in social identity theory. The group-value model asserts that legal procedures provide individuals with important information
regarding (1) the status of their social group within the social
hierarchy; and (2) their individual standing within the social hierarchy of the group with which they identify.122 The groupvalue model predicts that specific factors will influence people’s
perceptions of their self-identity and self-distinctiveness as a result of their interaction with a legal procedure: the amount of
voice they have in the interaction, the amount of control they
have over the procedure used to allocate resources, the level of
respect they receive from the decision maker, and the degree of
bias the resource allocator displays.123 Perhaps because they are
so important to an individual’s social identity, social scientists
have found that the relational signals inherent in the process by

See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential,
33 L. & SOC. INEQ. 473 (2008); Shelly Jackson & Mark Fondacaro, Procedural
Justice in Resolving Family Conflict: Implications for Youth Violence Prevention, 21 L. & POL’Y 101 (1999); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate
Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224 (1993); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988); Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee
Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287 (2005); Tom R. Tyler & Robert Folger, Distributional and Procedural Aspects of Satisfaction with Citizen-Police
Encounters, 1 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 281 (1980). For a review, see
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (2011).
122. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 80.
123. See Tyler, supra note 83; Tyler & Lind, supra note 21. Notably, people
value these constructs when the stakes of the distribution are either high or
low, and they value their ability to voice their opinion to the decision maker
even when they are explicitly told that doing so will not affect the distribution
of resources. See E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
(RAND Corp. ed., 1990); Tyler et al., supra note 121; see also E. Allan Lind et
al., Decision Control and Process Control Effects on Procedural Fairness Judgments, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 338 (1983).
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which a legal decision is reached are often stronger than the outcome itself in determining the degree to which the public confers
legitimacy onto a decision making tribunal.124
An application of these principles to Thibaut and Walker’s
taxonomy of decision-making procedures leads to similar conclusions about different legal procedures but through a different
psychological pathway. Thibaut and Walker classified procedures according to the degree of decision and process control that
the procedures afford litigants.125 When evaluating procedures
through the lens of relationality, however, we can create a relationality continuum driven by notions of (1) the disputants’ perceptions of the degree of voice they have in the proceeding, and
(2) the degree of respect they feel the procedure affords them,
from the perspective of the group-value model.
Inquisitorial procedures provide a single selection strategy
for information processing on the part of the tribunal, but at a
significant cost: potentially lowered perceptions of voice and respect from the disputants.126 We would therefore expect procedures with inquisitorial elements—such as a single inquisitor or
panel of investigators that decide the dispute’s outcome—to fall
on the left side of the relationality spectrum. In contrast, procedures with greater adversarial elements—for example, that allow the parties to investigate the dispute, call their own witnesses, and cross-examine other parties’ evidence with minimal
intrusion from the tribunal—are likely to result in greater perceptions of voice and respect from disputants.127
We would therefore expect procedures with these elements,
including many alternative dispute resolution procedures,128 to

124. See, e.g., Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 121, at 132 (“[T]his research
provided robust empirical evidence that individuals care deeply about the fairness of the process by which decisions are made, apart from considerations
about the outcome of the decision.”).
125. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 546.
126. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 80.
127. See Sevier, supra note 38.
128. Alternative dispute resolution procedures allow litigants to reach
agreement and to resolve conflicts in a setting that is less resource intensive
than formal litigation. Such procedures include (1) arbitration, in which a central decision maker arbitrates the dispute, but participants are not constrained
to the formal rules of evidentiary and civil procedure; and (2) mediation, in
which the decision of the mediator does not bind litigants unless they choose to
be bound. See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, ADR & THE LAW: A REPORT OF
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, THE FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW
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appear on the right side of the spectrum. A figure that captures
this continuum appears as Figure 3 below.
Figure 3. Relationality Continuum of Dispute Resolution
Procedures.

This continuum allows us to make predictions regarding
how the public will perceive the priorities of different conflict
resolution procedures. Research on the group-value model suggests that increasing the degree to which disputants feel that
they have been heard by the tribunal in a respectful manner increases their perceptions of the fairness and equity of the proceeding.129 This suggests that the public will perceive procedures
with adversarial features as prioritizing the justice objective of
conflict resolution. In contrast, vesting the gathering and presenting of evidence in the neutral investigatory fact finder
should lead to lowered perceptions of the fairness and equity of
the proceeding, albeit with an increase in public perceptions that
the fact finder will uncover the “true” facts of the dispute.130
Thus, procedures with inquisitorial features are likely to be perceived as prioritizing the truth objective of conflict resolution.
C. SYNTHESIS
The psychological research on relationality allows us to
draw broader conclusions about the popular legitimacy of legal
institutions. Recall that legitimacy is conferred on governing institutions when the values that the institutions embody comport

JOURNAL AND THE FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL (1997) (discussing alternative dispute resolution procedures in different areas of law).
129. See generally LIND & TYLER, supra note 70 (discussing how people’s
judgments of procedures and social processes are influenced by the form of social
interaction).
130. See Sevier, supra note 38, at 216 (suggesting people exposed to an inquisitional procedure perceived it as producing more truth than justice).
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with the values of the citizenry.131 Applying that principle, the
public should be most willing to legitimize legal tribunals when
the priorities of the procedures by which they resolve disputes
align with the perceived objectives of the underlying conflict.
Thus, Thibaut and Walker’s theory misses relational nuances
that underlie different legal disputes. Rather than assuming
that all legal disputes will be legitimized if they are decided adversarially, the relationality research suggests a more complex
set of preferences from the public. The public should be substantially more willing to legitimize disputes high in relationality
(the characteristic “conflicts of interest” that Thibaut and
Walker envision) if they are resolved by adversarial means,
which prioritize the just allocation of resources. But the public
also may be willing to legitimize truth-seeking legal disputes,
which are low in relationality, when they are decided under inquisitorial means. This Article tests these hypotheses in a series
of three original psychology experiments.
III. THREE EXPERIMENTS
This Article reports the results from three original experiments that: (1) empirically test the tenets of Thibaut and
Walker’s A Theory of Procedure; and (2) expand upon those findings to examine litigant preferences for the design of legitimate
legal institutions. Specifically, these experiments examine
whether litigants actually conceive of different cases—and
phases of a case—as associated with different conflict resolution
objectives; whether different procedures for resolving those disputes prioritize different objectives; and, most importantly,
whether the alignment of the priorities of legal procedures with
the perceived objective of the dispute results in a legal tribunal’s
increased institutional legitimacy.
These propositions are tested in three parts. Study 1 examines how people perceive cases that differ in relationality (that
is, “cognitive conflict” cases compared to “conflict of interest”
cases), as well as whether they perceive differences in the objectives of the liability and punishment phases of a trial. Study 2
examines the objectives that people believe are served by adversarial and inquisitorial dispute resolution procedures. Study 3
then examines how people’s preferences for these procedures differ as a function of different case types and trial phases.
131. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of legitimacy to governing institutions).
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A. STUDY 1: CONFLICT OBJECTIVES
The first study in this series explores whether non-lawyers
perceive different types of legal cases as concerned with different
dispute-resolution objectives. Participants read a vignette in
which they were asked to imagine themselves as spectators at a
local trial. The study contained two independent variables. First,
I manipulated the type of case to which the participants were
exposed, such that they read about a non-relational “whodunit”
case (that is, a “cognitive conflict”) or a relational “conflict of interest” case. Second, I manipulated the phase of the trial in
which the case appeared: either at the liability phase or at the
punishment phase. I measured participants’ views of the goals
that were effectuated by the legal proceeding that they read—
specifically, the degree to which the proceeding was concerned
with “truth” or “justice”—and collected demographic information
from them.
If participants perceive that different types of legal proceedings are associated with different psychological objectives, as
Thibaut and Walker suggest,132 and if those differences are a
function of relationality, we would expect two results to follow.
First, participants should perceive the low-relationality conflict
as primarily concerned with establishing factual truth. Conversely, participants should perceive the more relational, “conflict of interest” case as primarily concerned with questions of
justice and fairness.
Second, extending Thibaut and Walker’s theory to the phase
of the proceeding, we would expect that participants perceive the
liability phase of a trial (regardless of the type of case) as more
concerned with establishing factual truth, whereas the punishment phase as concerned primarily with questions of justice and
fairness.
1. Participants
Three hundred American participants were recruited
through Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online participation service, and paid $1.00 for their participation in this study. Participants were 48% female, averaged 37.63 years of age (with a SD
of 10.76), and ranged from 21 to 73 years old. Fifty-eight percent
of the sample had completed at least a college degree, and the
median income of the sample was between $40,000 and $49,999.
132. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 565–66 (concluding their theory of
procedure).
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Thirty-seven percent of participants identified as politically liberal, 30% of participants identified as politically moderate, and
23% of participants identified as conservative. A complete description of the sample for this study, as well as the two studies
that follow, appears in Table 1.
2. Procedure and Measures
Participants were randomly assigned to (1) one type of case,
either high or low in relationality; and (2) one phase of the case,
either liability or punishment, in a “factorial design.”133 Participants were told that the researchers were interested in their
opinions regarding different types of legal disputes. After providing their informed consent to participate in the study, they read
about a hypothetical case.

133. A factorial design is an experiment whose design consists of two or more
variables (or “factors”), each with discrete possible values or “levels,” and whose
experimental units take on all possible combinations of these levels across all
factors. In a “between subjects” design, such as the design of Study 1, each participant is randomly exposed to one level of each variable and is not exposed to
the others. See ANDY FIELD, DISCOVERING STATISTICS USING IBM SPSS STATISTICS 508–09 (4th ed. 2013) (explaining the meaning and types of factorial design).
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Table 1. Demographic Information (Studies 1, 2, and 3).
Study 1

Percentages (N)
Study 2

Study 3

Age
< 30
30–39
40–49
50–59
60–78

24.00 (72)
41.00 (123)
21.00 (63)
07.70 (23)
06.30 (19)

26.30 (52)
45.50 (90)
14.60 (29)
08.10 (16)
05.50 (11)

21.00 (71)
38.50 (130)
20.70 (70)
12.70 (43)
07.10 (24)

48.00 (144)
51.00 (153)

61.60 (122)
37.90 (75)

43.90 (148)
54.90 (185)

80.30 (240)
07.30 (22)
06.00 (18)
03.30 (10)

78.70 (155)
09.60 (19)
04.60 (09)
05.60 (11)

78.00 (262)
08.00 (27)
06.80 (23)
05.70 (19)

03.00 (09)

01.50 (03)

01.50 (05)

13.10 (39)
28.30 (84)
49.20 (146)
08.40 (25)
01.00 (03)

14.60 (29)
26.30 (52)
51.00 (101)
06.10 (12)
02.00 (04)

10.10 (34)
29.70 (100)
43.60 (147)
12.80 (43)
03.90 (13)

07.30 (22)
15.70 (47)
29.70 (89)
29.70 (89)
17.00 (51)

10.70 (21)
20.80 (41)
23.90 (47)
28.40 (56)
15.70 (31)

03.60 (12)
19.90 (67)
29.70 (100)
28.20 (95)
18.10 (61)

24.70 (74)
27.10 (81)
23.40 (70)
24.70 (74)

24.20 (48)
29.30 (58)
20.70 (41)
26.30 (52)

21.10 (71)
26.90 (91)
21.90 (74)
30.20 (102)

Gender
Male
Female

Race
Caucasian
African-American
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific Islander
Other

Education
High School
Some College
College
Master’s
Ph.D. or Professional

Political Affiliation
Very Conservative
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Very Liberal

Income
Less than $30,000
$30,000 - $49,000
$50,000 - $69,000
$70,000 or greater
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The subject of the case was the same across all four experimental conditions. The defendant was accused of striking and
severely injuring a small child with his vehicle on a rainy night
on a dimly lit road. In each experimental condition, participants
were told that, in addition to the police report of the accident, the
court would receive evidence of the child’s medical expenses and
suffering as well as testimony from the child’s family members
who witnessed the accident and its aftermath.
The focus of the dispute between the parties was the subject
of the case type manipulation. For half of the participants, who
were in the low-relationality condition, the parties did not dispute that negligent driving had caused the injury to the child.
They did dispute, however, that the defendant had been the person driving the vehicle. In this experimental condition, the focus
of the case was the factual determination of the driver’s identity.
For the remaining participants in the high-relationality condition, the focus of the case differed. The defendant did not dispute that he drove the vehicle that injured the child. He did dispute, however, that he had been driving negligently. He argued
that, despite the care that he exercised while driving on that
rainy night, the accident could not have been avoided. Thus, the
jury’s factual determinations in this condition would be subordinate to the relational question of whether his actions conformed
to societal norms: whether he exercised the care that an ordinary
person in the community would have exercised, which would vitiate his liability.
The legal proceeding in which the case unfolded was also
manipulated. Half of the participants encountered the case in
the context of the liability phase, in which the fact finder determines whether the defendant is subject to punishment for the
act of which he is accused. In this experimental condition, participants were told that the evidence collected by the court would
be used for this purpose—to determine whether the defendant
meets the legal requirements for punishment.
The remaining participants encountered the case in the context of the punishment phase. Here, participants were told that
the evidence was collected by the court for a different purpose.
Participants who were also in the low-relationality “case type”
condition were told here that the evidence was collected to determine the amount of restitution that would be paid to the family
on account of the defendant’s conduct. Participants who were
also in the high-relationality “case type” condition were told that
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the evidence was collected to determine the defendant’s sentence—the amount of time he should be incarcerated for causing
the accident. The distinctions between the experimental conditions are highlighted in Table 2.
After participants completed attention and comprehension
checks, they completed the dependent measures of the study.134
Five items measured the degree to which the proceeding to
which participants were exposed was concerned with truth.
These items included the following: (1) “How much do you think
the goal of this proceeding is to reach an accurate decision?”; (2)
“How much do you think the goal of the proceeding is to uncover
the true facts?”; (3) “How much do you think the goal of the proceeding was to reveal the correct information that the court
needs to make a decision?”; (4) “How likely do you think it is that
the goal of the proceeding is to reach the right factual decision?”;
and (5) “How much faith do you have that the goal of this proceeding is to resolve the dispute correctly on its facts?”

134. These questions measure the degree of perceived “truth” and “justice”
produced by different legal procedures on seven-point Likert scales. The items
were modified to gauge participants’ sense of the truth and justice produced by
the legal proceedings themselves, to which participants were randomly assigned. These modifications resulted in eleven items, which were randomized.
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Table 2. Summary of Experimental Manipulations
(Study 1).
Trial Phase
Case Type
Low-Relationality (underlying factual questions predominate)

High-Relationality (underlying factual questions subordinate to distributive fairness
concerns)

Liability

Punishment

Participants were told that
the perpetrator’s action was
negligent, but that the defendant disputes that he was
the perpetrator.

Participants were told that
the court is not determining
whether the defendant drove
the vehicle that struck the victim.

The court must collect evidence (in the form of witnesses and documents) to determine whether the
defendant in fact struck the
victim.

The court instead must determine how much the defendant owes in restitution
for the injury he inflicted.
The court must collect evidence (in the form of witnesses and documents) to determine just how much the
victim’s family had to spend
to recover from the injuries.
The court may also determine if the victim is owed
money for pain and suffering.

Participants were told that
the perpetrator does not dispute that he struck the victim.

Participants were told that
the court is not determining
whether the defendant drove
the vehicle that struck the victim.

The court must determine
whether the level of caution
that the defendant exhibited
(as determined by witnesses
and documents) was equal to
what an “ordinary prudent
person” in the community
would have exhibited under
the circumstances.

The court instead must determine how much time in
jail the defendant deserves
for injuring the victim. The
court must collect evidence
(in the form of witnesses and
documents) and apply it to
legal guidelines to decide
how much time in jail the defendant will receive.

Six items measured the degree to which the proceeding was
concerned primarily with justice. These items included: (1) “How
much do you think the goal of the proceeding is about rendering
a decision that is fair?”; (2) “How much do you believe that being
treated fairly by the courts is the major focus of this proceeding?”; (3) “How much is the fair treatment of people the main
focus of this proceeding?”; (4) “How much do you agree that the
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purpose of this proceeding is to reach a fair conclusion?”;
(5) “How much do you think that treating the parties fairly is the
point of this proceeding?”; and (6) “How much would you agree
that most people who go through this proceeding would say that
the point is to reach a fair decision?”
Participants then answered a series of demographic questions before being debriefed. Participants self-reported their age,
gender, race, ethnicity, income, and political orientation. They
also answered whether they had previous experience with the
courts and, if so, in what capacity.
3. Results
Results are reported in two parts. First, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)135 on the measures of truth and
justice in this study to examine their convergent and discriminant validity.136 Second, I examined participants’ perceptions of
the truth and justice produced by different types of cases and
different trial phases.
135. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a special form of factor analysis,
most commonly used in social science research. It is used to test whether
measures of a psychological construct are consistent with a researcher’s understanding of the nature of that construct (or “factor”), and the objective of confirmatory factor analysis therefore is to test whether the data fit the researcher’s hypothesized measurement model. In a confirmatory factor analysis,
the researcher first develops a hypothesis about what factors she believes are
underlying the measures used in the study and may impose constraints on the
model based on these a priori hypotheses. For example, if it is posited that there
are two factors accounting for the covariance in the measures, and that these
factors are unrelated to one another, the researcher can create a model where
the correlation between factor A and factor B is constrained to zero. “Model fit
measures” could then be obtained to assess how well the proposed model captured the covariance between all the items or measures in the model. If the constraints the researcher has imposed on the model are inconsistent with the sample data, then the results of statistical tests of model fit will indicate a poor fit,
and the model will be rejected. If the constraints are satisfactory and consistent
with the sample data, the results of statistical tests of model fit will indicate a
good fit. See generally TIMOTHY A. BROWN, CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
FOR APPLIED RESEARCH (2d ed. 2015) (explaining the principles and methods
involved in the confirmatory factor analysis technique).
136. Convergent and discriminant validity are subtypes of construct validity. The former measures the degree that constructs that should be related to
each other are, in fact, observed to be related to each other; the latter measures
whether constructs that should not be related to each other are, in fact, observed
to not be related to each other. See generally Donald T. Campbell & Donald W.
Fiske, Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod
Matrix, 56 PSYCHOL. BULL. 81 (1959) (explaining these statistical concepts).

2020]

[RELATIONAL] THEORY OF PROCEDURE

2025

a. Preliminary Analysis: Confirmatory Factor Analysis
I conducted the CFA using the Lavaan package from R Statistical Software.137 Based on past research,138 I hypothesized a
two-factor model to be confirmed by the CFA. The theorized
model contained the five truth items, which composed one factor
(truth), and six justice items, which composed a second factor
(justice).139 Figure 4 below illustrates the relationship between
the two factors, and Table 3 provides the measurements of model
fit.
As shown in Table 3, the metrics for measuring the fit of the
hypothesized model indicate good fit between the theorized
model and the data.140 Table 3 also provides standardized parameter estimates141 and demonstrates that this two-factor solution provides superior fit compared to a one-factor solution, in
which there is no meaningful difference between the truth and

137. Yves Rosseel, Lavaan: An R Package for Structural Equation Modeling,
48 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1 (2012). An analysis of the data revealed no univariate
or multivariate outliers.
138. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 16, at 543; Tyler & Sevier, supra note 14.
139. Because the data were normally distributed, I chose a maximum likelihood estimation in evaluating model fit. The truth and justice factors were permitted to be correlated based on prior evidence of a weak to moderate relationship between these dimensions.
140. These statistics include the goodness of fit index (GFI), comparative fit
index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). See generally REX B. KLINE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING (3d ed. 2011) (introducing different statistics of evaluating model fit).
Generally, test values for GFI, CFI, and TLI should be close to one, whereas
values for RMSEA and SRMR should be close to zero. Above 0.95 is considered
a good fit for CFI and TLI, with 0.90 considered a good fit for GFI (0.95 in some
cases). See Daire Hooper et al., Structural Equation Modelling: Guidelines for
Determining Model Fit, 6 ELECTRONIC J. BUS. RES. METHODS 53, 53–55 (2008).
Below 0.08 is considered an acceptable fit for SRMR, id. at 55, while a RMSEA
falling between 0.06 and 0.08 indicates a close to good fit. Sengul Cangur & Ilker
Ercan, Comparison of Model Fit Indices Used in Structural Equation Modeling
Under Multivariate Normality, 14 J. MOD. APPLIED STAT. METHODS 152, 157
(2015).
141. A standardized parameter estimate is a descriptive estimation—based
on the sample examined in an experimental study—of the true “value” of the
phenomena being examined in the population from which the sample is drawn.
See generally JAMES V. BECK & KENNETH J. ARNOLD, PARAMETER ESTIMATION
IN ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE 1 (1977) (defining the term and explaining its
significance).
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justice items.142 The items that loaded onto the separate factors
were averaged to form two scales: “Truth Objective” and “Justice
Objective.”143
Figure 4. Confirmatory Factor Analysis.

142. Because of the good fit indices, no post hoc modifications were made to
the two-factor solution, and the residual analysis was satisfactory. See generally
BROWN, supra note 135 (explaining principles of confirmatory factor analysis).
143. Five items, α = 0.91 (Truth); six items, α = 0.92 (Justice). The reliability
of a psychometric scale is measured by a Cronbach’s alpha statistic ranging from
0.00 (lowest reliability) to 1.00 (highest reliability), with acceptable reliability
greater than .80. See Lee J. Cronbach, Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests, 16 PSYCHOMETRIKA 297, 327–28 (1951) (discussing the range of
“α”). The two scales were weakly and negatively correlated with each other,
r(298) = -0.11, p = 0.048.
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Table 3. Fit Statistics for Two-Factor Solution
Estimate
Absolute Fit Indices
Model Chi-Square (df = 43)

122.32***

Goodness of Fit (GFI)

0.93

Standardized Root Mean Square Residual
(SRMR)

0.06

Relative Fit Indices
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)

0.96

Non-Centrality-Based Fit Indices
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)

0.97

Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA)

0.08

RMSEA 90% Confidence Interval

Model

X

OneFactor

1351.33

44

0.43

0.32

0.29

0.32

0.43

TwoFactor

122.33

43

0.93

0.06

0.96

0.08

0.97

2

df

GFI

SRMR

[0.06, 0.09]

TLI

RMSEA

CFI

b. Main Analysis
A mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to analyze the data.144 The analysis included (a) two be-

144. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) provides a statistical test of whether
the means of several groups are equal. ANOVA results are represented by an
F-statistic, and the sizes of the effects are represented by 2p. Means are denoted
by the letter “M” and standard deviations are denoted by the letters “SD.” See
ROBERT LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 168–72 (2d ed. 2016) (explaining empirical research methodologies and statistical techniques).

2028

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1987

tween-subjects factors: case type (low-relationality vs. high-relationality) and trial phase (liability vs. punishment); and (b) one
within-subjects factor, which captured participants’ judgments
of the extent to which the legal case was concerned with truth
and the extent to which it was concerned with justice.145
To test the hypothesis that people’s perceptions of the objective of a legal proceeding would differ as a function of the type of
case and the phase in which the case is situated, I conducted a 2
(case type) x 2 (phase) x 2 (objective: truth vs. justice) ANOVA
with repeated measures on the last variable.146 The analysis revealed an effect of the proceeding’s objective, such that ratings
of the degree to which the case was concerned with truth147 were
lower than ratings of the degree to which the case was concerned
with justice148 on average across all experimental conditions.149
The analysis also revealed a main effect of the trial phase,150
such that the composite of participants’ truth and justice ratings
were lower in the liability phase151 than in the punishment
phase.152
Differences are denoted as “statistically significant” in this Article if the
statistical tests indicate that the likelihood that the difference observed would
occur by chance is 5% or less (as indicated by the p-value as p < 0.05). A difference is “marginally significant” if the likelihood of seeing such a difference by
chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies
and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 485
n.117 (2003) (citing BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 1989)).
Bivariate correlations range from -1.00 (a perfect negative relationship)
to +1.00 (a perfect positive relationship). A bivariate correlation of 0.00 indicates
no relationship. See, e.g., EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH
453–54 (11th ed. 2007) (explaining different kinds of relationships between the
variables).
145. A mixed design experiment consists of at least one “between subjects”
factor, in which different participants are exposed to different versions of an
experimental variable, and one “within subjects” factor, in which participants
are exposed to multiple versions of an experimental variable. See FIELD, supra
note 133, at 592 (explaining the definition of mixed designs).
146. A repeated measures factor, which is part of a mixed subjects design,
compares multiple responses by the same participant to the experimental stimuli. See id. at 544 (providing the definition and examples for repeated-measures
designs).
147. M = 4.80, SD = 1.48.
148. M = 5.30, SD = 1.19.
149. F(1, 296) = 24.02, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.08.
150. F(1, 296) = 6.27, p = 0.013, η2p = 0.02.
151. M = 4.91, SD = 1.21.
152. M = 5.68, SD = 1.03.
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Importantly, and as predicted, these main effects were qualified by two significant two-way interactions. First, the analysis
revealed an interaction between participants’ perceptions of the
objective of dispute and the type of case under dispute.153 To explore this interaction, I examined participants’ perceptions of
truth and justice in low-relationality cases compared to high-relationality cases. Participants rated the objective of low-relationality cases154 as higher in truth than “conflict of interest”
cases.155 In contrast, they rated the objective of high-relationality cases156 as more concerned with justice than low-relationality
cases.157 This interaction is illustrated in Figure 5 below.
Figure 5. Perceptions of the Objectives of Different Trial
Proceedings.

153. F(1, 296) = 21.83, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.07.
154. M = 5.10, SD = 1.68.
155. M = 4.51, SD = 1.48, F(1, 298), p = 0.001, η2p = 0.04.
156. M = 5.46, SD = 1.29.
157. M = 5.12, SD = 1.01, F(1, 298), p = 0.015, η2p = 0.02. This comparison
and the comparison with respect to participants’ perceptions of the truth and
justice objectives of the liability phase were evaluated through a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to control for false positives (Type I
error). Both an ANOVA and a MANOVA are statistical tests, which produce
Fisher’s F-statistics, that examine whether the means of different groups are
statistically different or statistically equal. A MANOVA is a special type of analysis of variance where multiple dependent variables—which are at least moderately correlated with each other—are analyzed in tandem to reduce the likelihood of Type I error. See, e.g., Russell T. Warne, A Primer on Multivariate
Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) for Behavioral Scientists, 19 PRAC. ASSESSMENT RES. & EVALUATION 1, 2 (2014) (explaining the definition of MANOVA).
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Second, the analysis also revealed an interaction between
participants’ perceptions of the objective of the legal case and the
trial phase.158 To explore this interaction, I again examined participants’ perceptions of truth and justice in the liability phase
and in the punishment phase. As predicted, participants rated
the objective of the liability phase159 as more concerned with
truth than the punishment phase.160 In contrast, participants
rated the objective of the punishment phase161 as more concerned with justice than the liability phase.162 This two-way interaction is illustrated in Figure 6.163
Figure 6. Perceptions of the Objectives of Different
Trial Phases.

4. Discussion
The results from Study 1 support the view that the public
perceives that the resolution of relationally-distinct legal disputes involves different psychological objectives. Study 1 yielded
several findings consistent with Thibaut and Walker’s A Theory
158. F(1, 296) = 113.90, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28.
159. M = 5.46, SD = 1.32.
160. M = 4.14, SD = 1.55, F(1, 298) = 63.10, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.18.
161. M = 5.69, SD = 1.03.
162. M = 4.91, SD = 1.21, F(1, 298) = 35.86, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.11.
163. Somewhat surprisingly, the analysis also revealed a significant threeway interaction among case type, legal proceeding, and proceeding purpose, F(1,
296) = 11.09, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.04. An exploration of this interaction revealed
that the differences between perceptions of low- and high-relationality cases
was more muted in the punishment phase than in the liability phase.

2020]

[RELATIONAL] THEORY OF PROCEDURE

2031

of Procedure. First, I found that the public perceives the pursuit
of factual truth and the pursuit of relational justice as related
but distinct psychological objectives in legal dispute resolution.
Moreover, the public does not classify dispute resolution procedures as monolithically about truth or justice; rather, these objectives are associated systematically with different types of legal cases and with different phases of a legal case, depending on
the degree of relationality involved in the dispute.
In low-relationality cases, participants perceived that the legal decision maker’s primary function is to determine factual
truth. But in “conflict of interest” cases high in relationality,
where the court must determine whether a defendant’s conduct
was objectively reasonable in relation to communal norms, participants perceived that the tribunal’s function is to reach a decision that is distributively fair and procedurally just.
Similarly, the concept of relationality affected participants’
perceptions of the objectives of different phases of a trial. Insofar
as the liability phase is comparatively lower than the punishment phase in relationality, the public views the liability phase
as concerned more with the creation of factual truth than with
notions of justice. The converse is true with respect to the punishment phase, which is higher in relationality. When the court
is concerned not with the adjudication of guilt or liability, but
instead with the appropriate sentence, restitution, or damages
that a litigant must pay, the public views this phase of the trial
as more concerned with notions of distributive fairness and procedural justice, and less with establishing factual truth.
Altogether, this study suggests that the public associates
different types of legal disputes—and the circumstances under
which those cases are adjudicated—with different psychological
values and goals. The next study examines whether different
methods for resolving legal disputes are perceived as prioritizing
these goals differently.
B. STUDY 2: PROCEDURAL PRIORITIES
The second study in this series seeks to explore whether different conflict resolution procedures prioritize different conflict
resolution objectives. Study 2 also examines whether the pursuit
of factual truth and the pursuit of relational justice are both implicated in participants’ willingness to legitimize the decisions of
legal tribunals.
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In this study, participants read about a different trial at
their local courthouse. This time, I manipulated whether the dispute would be resolved pursuant to a relational, adversarial procedure or a non-relational, inquisitorial procedure. I then measured participants’ perceptions of the amount of truth and justice
that they expected to be produced under the procedure to which
they were exposed, in addition to several other items regarding
the proceeding, the witnesses and evidence, and the degree to
which participants would legitimize the tribunal’s ultimate decision.
If participants perceive different procedures for resolving legal disputes as prioritizing different psychological values, we
would predict that participants will (1) perceive the adversarial
procedure as prioritizing justice more so than the inquisitorial
procedure; and (2) perceive the inquisitorial procedure as prioritizing factual truth more so than the adversarial procedure.
Moreover, if Thibaut and Walker are correct, we would expect
that both truth and justice are necessary conditions precedent to
legitimizing a legal tribunal’s decision. Participants should
therefore legitimize legal decisions that are reached under either
procedure, but through different psychological pathways. This
Section reports the methodology and results of Study 2.
1. Participants, Procedures, and Measures
One hundred ninety-eight American participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online participation service, and paid $1.00 for their participation in Study 2.
Participants were 38% female, averaged 37.19 years of age (with
a SD of 10.62), and ranged from 20 to 78 years old. Fifty-nine
percent of the sample had completed at least a college degree,
and the median income of the sample was between $40,000 and
$49,999. Forty-four percent of participants identified as politically liberal, 24% of participants identified as politically moderate, and 31% of participants identified as conservative.164
Participants were told that the researchers were interested
in their opinions regarding different types of legal dispute resolution procedures. After providing their informed consent to participate in the study, they read about a hypothetical legal case.165

164. For a complete description of the sample for this study, see supra tbl.1.
165. The case was adapted from Sevier, supra note 38, at 214–21 (the pilot
study).
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The legal case, which was the same for all participants, involved a civil plaintiff suing a drug manufacturer for monetary
damages. The plaintiff alleged that, after taking the defendant’s
antibiotic medicine, she became violently ill with severe stomach
pains and related injuries. The evidence against the defendant
included testimony from the plaintiff, her family members, and
her treating physician regarding her alleged injuries; receipts
proving that she had purchased the defendant’s medication; and
invoices from the hospital emergency room where she was
treated. Evidence in the defendant’s favor included pre-market,
internal reports indicating that the drug was safe and effective.
Additionally, the court received expert testimony from a biologist
describing animal studies suggesting a link between the defendant’s product and illnesses similar to the plaintiff’s injuries.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two legal procedures to resolve the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant drug company. For half of the participants, the dispute
was resolved through adversarial methods. Participants learned
that each party was allowed to call its own witnesses, and that
the plaintiff called herself, her family members, her doctors, and
the expert witness to testify; the defendant primarily called its
employees to testify. Each party was permitted to ask questions
of the other party’s witnesses through cross-examination.
For the remaining participants, the dispute was resolved
through inquisitorial methods. In this condition, participants
learned that the judge, not the parties, called all of the witnesses
and questioned them, including the expert witness. The parties
were not allowed to meaningfully cross-examine the witnesses,
although they were allowed to ask minor clarification questions.
After all participants completed the attention and comprehension checks, they were asked several questions about their impressions of the trial.
The dependent measures in this study consisted of items
covering five topics, which were presented to participants in random order. Participants were asked questions related to: (1) the
credibility of the witnesses,166 (2) the perceived level of procedural justice afforded to the parties (as operationalized by items
166. Three items related to the perceived credibility of the trial witnesses:
(a) “Under this procedure, how motivated do you believe the witnesses were to
give testimony that was no slanted toward one party?”; (b) “Under this procedure, how much do you believe that the witness would testify truthfully?”; and
(c) “Under this procedure, how much do you think the witnesses’ testimony was
unbiased?”
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measuring perceived voice, respect, and control),167 (3) the degree to which the procedure that they were exposed to prioritized
the truth-finding goal of the courts,168 (4) the degree to which it
prioritized the overall fairness goal of the courts,169 and (5) the
degree to which they would legitimize a decision maker that used
the procedure to which they were exposed.170 The items were
measured on standard seven-point Likert scales.
As in Study 1, participants then answered a series of demographic questions before being debriefed. Specifically, participants self-reported their age, gender, race, ethnicity, income,

167. Three items measured participants’ perceptions of the procedural justice afforded by the procedure to which they were exposed: (a) “How much control does this procedure give parties over the outcome of the dispute?”; (b) “How
respected by the court do you believe parties would feel when the court uses this
procedure to resolve the dispute?”; and (c) “How much does this procedure give
parties the ability to persuade the decision maker of their point of view?” Rather
than measuring participants’ general impressions of procedural justice, these
items measured individual components of the construct. Both approaches are
accepted in the relevant literature.
168. Five items measured the extent to which the legal procedure to which
participants were exposed prioritized truth in fact finding. These items were:
(a) “How likely it is that a decision reached using this procedure will be accurate?”; (b) “How likely is it under this procedure that a court will uncover the
true facts?”; (c) “How likely is it that this procedure will reveal the right information that the court needs to make a decision?”; (d) “How much confidence
would you have in a court to make a good factual decision using this procedure?”;
and (e) “How much faith do you have that a court using this procedure will resolve disputes in a way that gets to the truth?”
169. Four items measured the extent to which the procedure to which participants were exposed prioritized justice. These items were: (a) “In general, I
can count on courts using this procedure to be just”; (b) “Overall, courts that use
this procedure treat parties fairly”; (c) “Most people who have their cases decided under this procedure would believe that it is just”; and (d) “Generally,
people receive fair treatment from courts that use this procedure.” These items
were adapted from Ambrose and Schminke’s overall fairness scale for organizational justice. See generally Maureen L. Ambrose & Marshall Schminke, The
Role of Overall Justice Judgments in Organizational Justice Research: A Test of
Mediation, 94 J. APPLIED PYSCHOL. 491 (2009) (examining overall justice and
its relationship with specific justice).
170. Finally, five items measured several aspects of the perceived legitimacy
of the court when it used the procedure to which participants were exposed: (a)
“How legitimate would you view verdicts that are reached using this procedure?”; (b) “How willing are you to abide by decisions that are reached using
this procedure?”; (c) “How willing are you to cooperate with legal tribunals that
make decisions using this procedure?”; (d) “How willing are you to engage with
legal tribunals that use this procedure to make decisions?”; and (e) “How willing
are you to respect legal decisions that are made using this procedure?”
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and political orientation. Participants also answered whether
they had previous experience with the courts and, if so, in what
capacity.
2. Results
Results are reported in three parts. First, I conducted two
preliminary analyses: (1) a reliability analysis for the index variables representing witness credibility, perceived procedural justice, and perceived legitimacy;171 and (2) a CFA for the nine
items measuring the extent to which the decision-making procedures prioritized truth and justice. Second, I conducted the main
analysis, which examined participants’ perceptions of the truth
and justice produced by adversarial and inquisitorial procedures
for resolving the legal dispute. Finally, I conducted a path analysis172 to determine the psychological pathways between the decision-making procedure to which participants were exposed and
their willingness to legitimize courts that use those procedures.
a. Preliminary Analyses
The first set of analyses examine the construction of three
index variables from the items measuring witness credibility,
perceived procedural justice, and perceived legitimacy (and the
reliability of those indices). Each proposed index variable had
satisfactory reliability; the individual items were therefore averaged to form an index measuring witness credibility,173 perceived
procedural justice,174 and perceived legitimacy175 to be used in
the serial path analysis.
As in Study 1, to construct the repeated-measures variable
for the main analysis, I conducted a CFA on the items measuring

171. A reliability analysis examines how well different items purporting to
measure a psychological construct correlate with each other, such that they can
be averaged together as a measurement of the psychological construct. See
FIELD, supra note 133, at 706–16 (explaining the meaning of reliability and how
to conduct reliability analysis).
172. A path analysis (also referred to as a “mediation analysis”) consists of a
series of regressions that seek to create a psychological pathway that explains
the effect of a predictor variable on a dependent variable. See id. at 408–09 (explaining the definition of mediation analysis). For a detailed explanation of a
path analysis, see infra notes 189–97 and accompanying text.
173. Three items, α = 0.85.
174. Three items, α = 0.91.
175. Five items, α = 0.95.
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the perceived truth produced by the different procedures176 and
the perceived justice that they provided.177 I again hypothesized
a two-factor model to be confirmed by the CFA. The theorized
model contained five truth items, which composed one factor of
the model, and four justice items, which composed a second factor.178 Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the factors.
Figure 7. Confirmatory Factor Analysis.

Standard fitness measures indicated good fit between the
theorized model and the data.179 The items that loaded onto the
separate factors were averaged to form two scales, “Truth Produced”180 and “Justice Produced.”181
b. Main Analysis
To test the hypothesis that participants would perceive that
different dispute resolution procedures differentially prioritize
176. See generally Sevier, supra note 38 (providing studies on perceived
truth).
177. See generally Ambrose & Schminke, supra note 169 (providing studies
on overall justice).
178. Because the data were normally distributed, I chose a maximum likelihood estimation in evaluating model fit. As in Study 1, the “truth” and “justice”
factors were permitted to be correlated based on prior evidence of a moderate
relationship between these dimensions.
179. GFI, TLI, and CFI all > 0.90; RMSEA and SRMR both < 0.08.
180. Five items, α = 0.95.
181. Four items, α = 0.86. The scales were weakly and positively correlated,
r(196) = 0.28, p < 0.001.
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truth and justice, I conducted a 2 (procedure: adversarial vs. inquisitorial) x 2 (production: truth vs. justice) mixed-design
ANOVA with repeated measures on the “production” variable.
The analysis revealed a main effect of production,182 such that
ratings of the truth produced by the procedure183 were higher
than ratings of the justice produced by the procedure across all
experimental conditions.184 The analysis also revealed a main effect of legal procedure,185 such that the composite of participants’
truth and justice ratings were higher in the adversarial condition186 than in the inquisitorial condition.187
Most importantly, and as predicted, the analysis revealed a
significant interaction between the procedure to which participants were exposed and their evaluations of the truth and justice
produced by the procedure.188 Because I hypothesized that participants would perceive the inquisitorial procedure as better at
producing truth than the adversarial procedure, and that the adversarial procedure would be better at producing justice than the
inquisitorial procedure, I examined the nature of this interaction
as a function of participants’ perceptions of truth and their perceptions of justice.
As predicted, an analysis of participants’ perceptions of the
tribunal’s decisional accuracy revealed a significant effect of procedure,189 such that they perceived the inquisitorial procedure190
as producing greater truth than the adversarial procedure.191
Conversely, and as predicted, an analysis of participants’ perceptions of the court’s production of overall justice also revealed a
significant effect of procedure,192 but with the adversarial
procedure193 viewed as producing greater justice than the inquisitorial procedure.194 This significant interaction is illustrated in
Figure 8.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

F(1, 196) = 23.82, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.11.
M = 4.88, SD = 1.42.
M = 4.36, SD = 1.45.
F(1, 196) = 7.68, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.04.
M = 4.85, SD = 1.17.
M = 4.40, SD = 1.47.
F(1, 196) = 87.91, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.31.
F(1, 196) = 6.59, p = 0.011, η2p = 0.03.
M = 5.13, SD = 1.43.
M = 4.62, SD = 1.37.
F(1, 196) = 60.39, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.24.
M = 5.08, SD = 0.97.
M = 3.67, SD = 1.50.
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Figure 8. Perceived Truth and Justice Produced by
Procedure.

c. Serial Path Analysis
To understand the influence of a dispute resolution procedure’s production of truth and justice on its perceived legitimacy,
I conducted a multimediator analysis.195
The analysis contained the following variables: (1) legal procedure as an independent variable;196 (2) the perceived credibility of the witnesses under the procedure, the perceived accuracy
produced by the procedure, the perceived procedural justice pro-

195. The multimediator analysis was conducted using Model 6 from Professor Andrew Hayes’s “PROCESS” statistical software macroinstruction. See ANDREW F. HAYES, INTRODUCTION TO MEDIATION, MODERATION, AND CONDITIONAL PROCESS ANALYSIS: A REGRESSION-BASED APPROACH 427–28, 446
(2013) (presenting and explaining Andrew Hayes’s Model 6). A mediation analysis detects “when a predictor affects a dependent variable indirectly through
at least one intervening variable, or mediator.” Kristopher J. Preacher & Andrew F. Hayes, Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies for Assessing and Comparing Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models, 40 BEHAV. RES. METHODS
879, 879 (2008). The mediation analysis reported in this Article is performed
using a linear regression analysis and reports unstandardized coefficients, “b,”
and standard errors, “SE.” It also reports a “t” statistic, which determines
whether the coefficients are statistically significant. A linear regression is a statistical test that estimates the independent effects of several predictor variables
on a continuous dependent variable. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 144, at
257–69 (explaining the concept of linear regression).
196. This variable was coded as “0” for the adversarial procedure and “1” for
the inquisitorial procedure.
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duced by the procedure, and the perceived overall justice produced by the procedure as mediator variables; and (3) perceptions of the procedure’s legitimacy as a dependent variable.
I first examined whether participants perceived adversarial
and inquisitorial decision-making procedures to be differentially
legitimate. As expected, the analysis revealed no significant difference in perceptions of legitimacy as a function of the procedure to which participants were exposed.197 In examining the relationship among a legal procedure, the truth it produces, the
justice it produces, and its perceived legitimacy, I examined two
indirect pathways: a truth pathway and a justice pathway. I examine these pathways separately below, through a series of linear regressions.
Truth Path. To test the hypothesis that a legal procedure’s
perceived legitimacy is, in part, a function of the amount of truth
that the procedure is perceived to produce, I constructed a Truth
path with (1) the legal procedure to which participants were exposed as the independent variable, (2) the credibility of the witnesses and the overall accuracy produced as mediator variables,
and (3) perceptions of the procedure’s legitimacy as the dependent variable.198
The analysis yielded a significant effect of the procedure on
the perceived credibility of the witnesses,199 reflecting greater
perceived credibility of witnesses in the inquisitorial condition
than in the adversarial condition. Witness credibility was, in
turn, significantly associated with the legal procedure’s decisional accuracy, such that where witnesses were perceived as
more credible, perceptions of the tribunal’s decisional accuracy
increased.200 Finally, perceptions of the tribunal’s decisional accuracy were positively associated with perceptions of the tribunal’s legitimacy.201 Importantly, this pathway composed a serial,
indirect effect of the legal procedure to which participants were
197. Madversarial = 4.97, SDadversarial = 1.35; Minquisitorial = 4.98, SDinquisitorial = 1.61;
F(1, 196) = 0.00, p = 0.962, η2p = 0.00. Because this analysis reveals a nonsignificant total effect of the procedure to which participants were exposed on their
subsequent perceptions of the legitimacy of the legal procedure, I fixed this relationship to zero in the multimediator analysis that follows.
198. Witness credibility was included in the analysis because previous research has found that it mediates the relationship between the legal procedure
to which participants were exposed and their perceptions of the truth that the
procedure produces.
199. b = 1.63, SE = 0.19, p < 0.001.
200. b = 0.56, SE = 0.07, p < 0.001.
201. b = 0.40, SE = 0.07, p < 0.001.
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exposed on their perceptions of the tribunal’s legitimacy. The
ninety-five percent bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence interval (BCaCI)202 for this indirect effect, based on 5,000
samples, was statistically significant.203
Justice Path. To test the hypothesis that a legal procedure’s
perceived legitimacy is, in part, also a function of the amount of
perceived justice that the procedure produces, I constructed a
Justice path with (1) the legal procedure to which participants
were exposed as the independent variable, (2) the degree to
which participants experienced the components of procedural
justice (including control, voice, and respect) and the overall justice produced as mediator variables, and (3) perceptions of the
procedure’s legitimacy as the dependent variable.204
The analysis yielded a significant effect of the procedure on
perceptions of procedural justice, reflecting greater perceived
control, voice, and respect afforded to litigants in the adversarial
condition than in the inquisitorial condition.205 Greater perceived control, voice, and respect afforded, in turn, were significantly associated with the legal tribunal’s overall justice, such
that greater procedural fairness increased perceptions of overall
justice.206 Finally, perceptions of the overall justice produced by
the legal procedure were positively associated with perceptions
of the tribunal’s legitimacy.207 Importantly, this pathway also
composed an indirect mediation effect of the legal procedure to
202. Bootstrapping is a nonparametric technique for testing indirect effects
that does not assume that the variables of interest are normally distributed.
The bootstrapping technique takes a large number of samples, with replacement, from the data and computes the indirect effect for each sample. The
ninety-five percent Confidence Interval (CI) is derived by sorting the elements
of the vector of the indirect effect from low to high. For a sample of 5000, the
250th score in the sorted distribution defines the lower limit of the CI, and the
upper limit is defined as the 4751st score. If the CI does not include a value of
zero, the indirect effect is statistically significant. See Kristopher J. Preacher &
Andrew F. Hayes, SPSS and SAS Procedures for Estimating Indirect Effects in
Simple Mediation Models, 36 BEHAV. RES. METHODS, INSTRUMENTS, & COMPUTERS 717 (2004).
203. Estimate = 0.37, SE = 0.12, BCaCI [0.11, 0.59].
204. Procedural justice was included in the analysis because previous research suggests that it is correlated with perceptions of overall justice, such that
it may act as an antecedent cause. See Ambrose & Schminke, supra note 169. It
is also differentially associated with different legal procedures. See Sevier, supra note 38.
205. b = -1.90, SE = 0.22, p < 0.001.
206. b = 0.54, SE = 0.05, p < 0.001.
207. b = 0.48, SE = 0.08, p < 0.001.
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which participants were exposed on their perceptions of the tribunal’s legitimacy. The bias-corrected bootstrap CI for this indirect effect, again based on 5000 samples, was statistically significant.208 Additionally, a contrast analysis revealed that the
Justice pathway was a significantly stronger pathway to the tribunal’s legitimacy than was the Truth pathway.209
Additional paths. In addition to the two hypothesized pathways tested above, I tested all other possible indirect pathways
composed of different combinations of the six variables involved
in the path analyses, to determine other routes by which legal
procedures attain popular legitimacy. The analysis revealed, in
addition to the Truth and Justice pathways analyzed above, four
statistically significant paths from the legal procedure to which
participants were exposed to their perceptions of the procedure’s
legitimacy. A series of contrast analyses revealed that all four
additional paths were significantly weaker than the Justice
pathway, and none were stronger than the Truth pathway. All
significant paths are listed in Table 4, which includes their point
estimate, standard error, and bootstrapped confidence interval.
The table also provides measures of the comparative strength of
all significant pathways. An illustration of the complete path
model appears in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Multimediator Analysis.

208. Estimate = -0.49, SE = 0.13, BCaCI [-0.78, -0.36].
209. Estimate = -0.57, SE = 0.09, BCaCI [-0.77, -0.42].
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Table 4. Significant Paths Between Legal Procedure and
Perceived Legitimacy210
Estimate

Boot. SE

BCaCI

“Justice” (X → J1 → J2 → Y)

0.48a

0.14

[0.25, 0.79]

“Truth” (X → T1 → T2 → Y)

-0.38b

0.12

[-0.65, -0.17]

X → T1 → Y

-0.37b

0.13

[-0.63, -0.13]

X → J2 → Y

0.23c

0.10

[0.06, 0.44]

X → T2 → Y

0.16c

0.09

[0.01, 0.38]

X → T1 → T2 → J2 → Y

-0.10d

0.04

[-0.18, -0.03]

3. Discussion
Study 2 builds on Study 1 in several ways, while confirming
several hypotheses suggested in Thibaut and Walker’s A Theory
of Procedure.211 Most importantly, the results strongly suggest
that the psychological goals of establishing factual truth and producing relational justice contribute to the public’s willingness to
legitimize legal tribunals. Participants in this study legitimized
legal disputes decided under adversarial methods and inquisitorial methods equally. But the pathway to legitimacy varied, such
that the adversarial system achieved popular legitimacy through
heightened perceptions of voice and procedural justice, whereas
the inquisitorial system achieved popular legitimacy through
perceived increases in the accuracy of the tribunal’s fact finding
and the credibility of its witnesses. This study suggests that adversarial and inquisitorial dispute resolution paradigms can
both attain legitimacy, but through different pathways. Weaknesses with respect to one of these psychological goals do not necessarily doom a legal procedure to illegitimacy but, especially if
the procedure is low in relational justice, it increases the odds.
Critically, the results reveal a tradeoff between adversarial
and inquisitorial dispute resolution systems with respect to the
psychological objectives that they prioritize. In this study, there
210. “X” denotes Legal Procedure, “T1” denotes Perceived Witness Credibility, “T2” denotes Perceived Accuracy, “J1” denotes Perceived Procedural Justice,
“J2” denotes Perceived Overall Justice, and “Y” denotes Perceived Legitimacy.
Estimates with different superscripts are significantly different at p < 0.05.
211. See supra Part I.A.
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was a strong and statistically significant difference between the
ability of the adversary system—where parties have significant
control over the presentation of the evidence to the fact finder—
and the inquisitorial system—where the judge largely controls
the collection of the evidence—to produce factual truth and to
attain relational justice. Specifically, the adversary system was
deemed superior to the inquisitorial system with respect to producing fair decisions, whereas the inquisitorial system was superior to the adversarial system in producing accurate decisions.
Altogether, Study 1 suggests that the public associates different types of cases and trial phases with different psychological
values and objectives, and Study 2 suggests that the public views
different legal procedures as prioritizing these objectives differently. A question arises—untheorized and untested by Thibaut
and Walker—whether the public prefers legal procedures whose
priorities align with the conflict resolution objectives of the case
in which the procedure is used. The final study in this series addresses this question.
C. STUDY 3: INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
Our final study seeks to extend the findings from Studies 1
and 2 by examining the public’s preferences for legal procedures:
specifically, whether participants prefer dispute resolution procedures whose priorities align better with the public’s perception
of the objectives of the legal proceeding. The study therefore manipulated three variables. First, as in Study 1, I manipulated the
type of case to which participants were exposed, as well as the
phase of the trial presented to participants. Second, participants
read about two different dispute resolution procedures—the adversarial method and the inquisitorial method—and evaluated
their fitness for resolving the legal dispute. I then measured participants’ perceptions of the trial’s objectives, their opinions of
the priorities of the procedures used to resolve the dispute, and
their preferences for the two procedures. The following section
reports the methodology and results of Study 3.
1. Participants, Procedures, and Measures
Three hundred thirty-nine American participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $1.00 for
their participation in Study 3. Participants were 55% female, averaged 39.19 years of age (with a SD of 11.90), and ranged from
20 to 72 years old. Sixty percent of the sample had completed at
least a college degree, and the median income of the sample was
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between $50,000 and $59,999. Forty-six percent of participants
identified as politically liberal, 30% of participants identified as
politically moderate, and 24% of participants identified as conservative.212
As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were told that the researchers were interested in their opinions regarding different
types of legal disputes. After providing their informed consent to
participate in the study, they read about the hypothetical legal
case that was the focus of Study 1, in which a defendant was
accused of striking a small child with his vehicle on a dark, rainy
night on a poorly-lit road.
a. Experimental Manipulations
As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to two
different phases of the case: either the liability phase or the punishment phase. The remaining manipulations occurred within a
repeated-measures design. Participants read, in random order,
two different versions of the case: (a) the low-relationality version, in which a factual determination was the central focus; or
(b) the high-relationality version, in which a relational comparison was the central focus.
Participants were then exposed to two different procedures
by which the fact finder could resolve the dispute: (1) through an
adversarial procedure (described as Option A), in which the parties presented the evidence to the fact finder (and cross-examined the evidence produced by their adversaries); or (2) through
an inquisitorial procedure (described as Option B), in which the
judge would decide the evidence to collect and would primarily
examine and question the witnesses. The information that the
participants received regarding these two procedures appears in
Table 5 below.
b. Dependent Measures
After participants completed attention and comprehension
checks, they completed the dependent measures of the study.
The dependent measures were administered in two phases. Participants encountered the first set of dependent measures upon
reading the facts of the case. To replicate the results of Study 1,

212. See supra tbl.1 for a complete description of the sample for this study.
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participants were asked for their impressions of the purpose of
the case along two dimensions: how much the case was primarily
concerned with questions of truth and with questions of justice.213
Table 5. Summary of Experimental Manipulations
(Study 3).
Case Type

Cognitive Conflict
Participants were told that
the perpetrator’s action was
negligent, but that the defendant disputes that he was
the perpetrator.
The court must collect evidence (in the form of witnesses and documents) to determine whether the
defendant in fact struck the
victim.

Legal
Procedure

Adversarial

Participants learned that each
party would be allowed to
call its own witnesses (including expert witnesses) and
could question those witnesses.
Each party would be permitted to ask questions of the
other party’s witnesses
through cross-examination.

Conflict of Interest
Participants were told that the
perpetrator does not dispute
that he struck the victim.
The court must determine
whether the level of caution
that the defendant exhibited (as
determined by witnesses and
documents) was equal to what
an “ordinary prudent person”
in the community would have
exhibited under the circumstances.

Inquisitorial

Participants learned that the
judge, not the parties, would
call all of the witnesses and
question them, including any
expert witnesses.
The parties would not be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses, although they would be
allowed to ask minor clarification questions.

213. Participants answered, in random order, the same items that were presented in Study 1. See supra Part III.A.2.
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Participants encountered the second set of dependent
measures after they were presented with the two procedures by
which the fact finder could resolve the dispute. Here, participants answered two sets of questions in random order. One set
of questions consisted of nine items that measured participants’
perceptions of the truth and justice that would be produced by
the procedures, as in Study 2. This time, however, the items were
modified slightly to force participants to make direct comparisons between the adversarial method and the inquisitorial
method. For example, one of the “Truth Produced” items in this
study asked, on a seven-point Likert scale (anchored at Option
A = -3 and Option B = +3), “Which Option will better lead the
court to uncover the true facts?” An example of a modified “Justice Produced” item was “Under which Option will people be
treated more fairly overall?” In addition to these nine items, participants were asked to make two dichotomous choices: “Which
Option will result in more truth being discovered?” and “Which
Option treats parties more fairly?” All modified items used in
Study 3 appear in Table 6.
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Table 6. Modified Procedural Choice Items.214
Items

Text

Truth
Item 1

Which Option will lead to a decision that is more accurate?

Item 2

Which Option will better lead the court to uncover the facts?

Item 3

Which Option will better reveal the information the court needs
to make the right decision?

Item 4

Which Option gives you greater confidence that the court will
make a correct factual decision?

Item 5

Which Option gives you more faith that the court will resolve
the dispute correctly on the facts?

Justice
Item 1

Which Option will lead to fairer treatment of the parties to the
dispute?

Item 2

Under which Option can you count on people being treated
fairly by the courts?

Item 3

Which Option is more likely to lead to the fair treatment of parties?

Item 4

The way things work under which Option would create a fairer
proceeding?

Item 5

Which Option leads to better treatment of the parties in this
case?

Item 6

Under which Option do you think people would say they’ve
been treated fairly?

Dichotomous
Item 1

Which Option will result in more “truth” being discovered?

Item 2

Which Option treats people more fairly?

The final set of dependent measures examined participants’
preferences for each procedure. Participants responded to three
items, on seven-point Likert scales (anchored at Option A = -3
214. Truth and justice items were presented on a seven-point scale anchored
at “Option A” and “Option B.” The dichotomous questions presented participants with a forced choice between Option A and Option B.
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and Option B = +3): “In light of the proceeding you’ve read about,
which Option for resolving the dispute do you prefer more?”;
“Which Option do you like better, in light of goals of the proceeding?”; and “Which Option would you choose (if you could) for resolving a dispute similar to the one you read about?” Participants also responded to one item with a dichotomous choice:
“Which Option do you prefer better for resolving the legal case
you read about?” These items were presented to participants in
random order.
After completing these dependent measures, participants
repeated the process after being exposed to the second version of
the case. Participants were told that their answers to the dependent measures for the second version of the case might be the
same as their answers to the questions following the first version
of the case or that their answers might differ. Finally, as in Studies 1 and 2, participants answered a series of demographic questions before they were debriefed and the study concluded.
2. Results
This section proceeds in two parts. First, it analyzes the
items that form the dependent measures in this study. Second,
it attempts to replicate the results from Studies 1 and 2, and it
examines participants’ preferences for different procedures used
to resolve cases that differ in relationality.
a. Preliminary Analyses
The first set of analyses examined the construction of five
index variables that will serve as predictors and dependent
measures in Study 3. Each index variable had satisfactory reliability; individual items were therefore averaged to form an index
measuring truth objective, justice objective, truth production,
justice production, and procedural preference.215
b. Main Analyses
The analysis of the results of Study 3 is three-fold. First, the
analysis attempts to replicate the two-way interactions, found in
Study 1, between (1) case type and proceeding objective, and (2)
trial phase and proceeding objective. Second, it attempts to conceptually replicate the interaction, found in Study 2, between the
215. Truth objective: 5 items, α = 0.93; justice objective: 6 items, α = 0.93;
truth production: 5 items, α = 0.96; justice production: 4 items, α = 0.93; and
procedural preference: 3 items, α = 0.93.
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legal procedure to which participants were exposed and their
perceptions of the accuracy and justice produced by those procedures. Finally, Study 3 extends these findings by examining
whether participants prefer procedures that produce truth and
justice in alignment with the type of case under dispute.
Proceeding objectives. To replicate the results from Study 1,
and to test the hypothesis that people’s perceptions of the objective of a legal proceeding differs as a function of the type of case
and the phase in which the case is situated, I conducted a 2 (case
type: low-relationality vs. high-relationality) x 2 (trial phase: liability vs. punishment) x 2 (objective: truth vs. justice)
ANOVA216 with repeated measures on the first and last variable.
As expected, the analysis revealed two significant two-way interactions between case type and objective,217 and between trial
phase and objective.218
As in Study 1, these two-way interactions revealed that lowrelationality cases and the liability phase of a trial were more
associated with establishing truth than were high-relationality
cases and the punishment phase of a trial.219 Conversely, highrelationality cases and the punishment phase of a trial were
more strongly associated with providing justice.220
Legal Procedures. To conceptually replicate the results from
Study 2, and to test the hypothesis that different legal procedures prioritize different conflict resolution objectives, I conducted a one-way, repeated measures ANOVA on participants’
perceptions of which Option (A or B) would produce greater truth
and greater justice. As expected, the analysis revealed a significant effect of conflict objective.221 Participants more strongly associated Option B, the inquisitorial procedure, with establishing

216. See supra note 150.
217. F(1, 674) = 114.44, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.15.
218. F(1, 674) = 129.86, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.16.
219. For case type: M-non-relational = 4.95, SD = 1.63; M-relational = 4.36,
SD = 1.66; F(1, 338) = 49.42, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.13. For trial phase: M-liability =
5.37, SD = 2.60; M-restitution = 3.99, SD = 2.50; F(1, 337) = 100.19, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.23.
220. For case type, M-non-relational = 4.87, SD = 1.53; M-relational = 5.47,
SD = 1.22; F(1, 338) = 59.33, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.15. For trial phase, M-liability =
4.80, SD = 2.29; M-restitution = 5.52, SD = 2.21; F(1, 337) = 34.66, p < 0.001, η2p
= 0.09.
221. F(1, 676) = 29.16, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.04.
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truth compared to the adversarial procedure.222 Conversely, participants more strongly associated Option A, the adversarial procedure, with providing justice.223
Procedural Preferences. Finally, I examined whether participants preferred legal procedures whose perceived production of
truth or justice align with the perceived objective of the legal
proceeding. To examine this hypothesis, I first examined participants’ dichotomous choice between Option A and Option B in
low-relationality and high-relationality cases. I supplemented
this analysis by examining the strength of participants’ preferences for Option A and Option B in those cases.
To test whether participants’ preferences for the adversarial
procedure (Option A) and the inquisitorial procedure (Option B)
depended on the type of case to which participants were exposed,
I conducted a repeated-measures test of independence224 with
the legal case (low vs. high relationality) as the predictor variable and participants’ choice between Option A and Option B as
the dependent variable. As predicted, the analysis revealed a significant effect of case type on participants’ choices,225 such that
they preferred Option A (the adversarial procedure) to Option B
(the inquisitorial procedure) in high-relationality cases,226 and
vice versa in low-relationality cases.227 The shift in participants’
preferences is illustrated in Figure 10.

222. M = 0.41, SD = 2.40.
223. M = -0.28, SD = 2.40. The midpoint of the seven-point Likert scale was
set to zero. Positive mean scores indicate a preference for Option B (the inquisitorial model), whereas negative mean scores indicate a preference for Option A
(the adversarial model).
224. A test of independence assesses whether unpaired observations of two
categorical variables, expressed in a contingency table, are independent of each
other. It is expressed as a chi-squared test statistic with a corresponding pvalue. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 144, at 220.
225. Cochran’s Q (df = 1, N = 339) = 75.00, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.22.
226. Option A = 67.00%, Option B = 33.00%.
227. Option A = 44.80%, Option B = 55.20%.
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Figure 10. Procedural Preferences as a Function of the
Relationality of the Proceeding.

Finally, in light of the finding that participants preferred
the adversarial procedure in high-relationality cases and preferred the inquisitorial procedure in low-relationality cases, I examined the strength of participants’ preferences for those procedures. I conducted a one-way ANOVA with case type (relational
vs. non-relational) as the predictor variable and participants’ degree of preference for either Option A or Option B as the dependent variable. As predicted, the ANOVA revealed a statistically
significant effect of case type on the degree of participants’ preferences for Option A and Option B,228 such that they leaned toward the inquisitorial procedure in non-relational cases,229 and
they exhibited a strong preference for the adversarial procedure
in relational, “conflict of interest” cases.230
Follow-up tests compared whether participants’ preferences
for each procedure differed from the midpoint of the scale (set at
zero), indicating a neutral view toward the procedures. The results revealed that, although participants favored the inquisitorial procedure (compared to the adversarial procedure) for resolving “cognitive conflict” cases, that preference did not differ
statistically from a neutral position.231 Conversely, participants’
preference for the adversarial procedure in relational, “conflict
228.
229.
230.
231.

F(1, 338) = 69.27, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.17.
M = -0.09, SD = 2.14.
M = 0.71, SD = 2.05.
t(338) = 0.79, p = 0.43, Cohen’s d = 0.04 (effect size).
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of interest” cases did differ significantly from a neutral position
on the Likert scale.232 The results with respect to the strength of
participants’ procedural preferences are illustrated in Figure 11.
Figure 11. Strength of Preference for Dispute Resolution
Procedures.

3. Discussion
Study 3 provides critical insights regarding the circumstances under which the public prefers—and is willing to legitimize—different dispute resolution procedures. In this respect,
Study 3 replicated the most important findings from Studies 1
and 2: (1) that different types of disputes and trial phases are
associated with different psychological objectives; and (2) that
the different ways in which those disputes are resolved also are
associated with those goals and values, in a manner that affects
their popular legitimacy. Importantly, Study 3 extends these
findings by demonstrating that an alignment of the proceeding’s
perceived objective and the legal procedure’s perceived priorities
results in legal decisions with greater popular legitimacy. Conversely, a misalignment between the proceeding’s objective and
the legal procedure that resolves the proceeding leads to decreases in the decision maker’s perceived legitimacy.
In this study, I found that participants far preferred the adversarial dispute resolution procedure—which provides litigants
with greater voice in the proceedings and increased feelings of

232. t(338) = -6.36, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.35 (effect size).
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dignity and respect compared to the civil-law inquisitorial procedure—in legal proceedings that are characterized as higher in
relationality, and in which accurate fact finding is deemed a subordinate goal to producing relational justice. Moreover, although
the strength of participants’ preference for the inquisitorial procedure was weaker, they preferred it to the adversarial procedure when deciding cases high in “cognitive conflict,” in which
the importance of accurate factual determinations is paramount.
These findings have important implications for Thibaut and
Walker’s A Theory of Procedure, the decisions of procedural policymakers, and for institutional design, as it relates to formal
legal tribunals and alternative dispute resolution procedures.
This Article now turns to these implications, the limitations of
the findings reported here, and the future direction of this research more generally.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Empirically-based approaches to institutional design provide critical information to legal policymakers.233 In designing a
dispute resolution paradigm, policymakers are now, more than
ever before, able to use real data to understand how litigants and
the public at large value the paradigm’s effectiveness, in light of
the purported goals associated with the proceeding, and whether
they prefer the paradigm to its alternatives.234 Increased public
support for a dispute resolution paradigm is a critical aspect of
that paradigm’s ultimate success, longevity, and popular legitimacy.235 To that end, this Article examines John Thibaut and
233. See, e.g., Stephen Giacchino & Andrew Kakabadse, Successful Policy
Implementation: The Route to Building Self-Confident Government, 69 INT’L
REV. ADMIN. SCI. 139, 139 (2003) (drawing upon an empirical study to determine what factors influenced the successful implementation of public policy in
Malta, and in what way the government should organize itself to best deliver
the policy); see also Will Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New
Contemporaneous Case Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60, 147 (2013) (explaining
that evidence-based policymaking offers much promise for improving federal
civil rulemaking, especially to address questions of controlling access to the
courts and the amount of litigation brought).
234. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Aiming for Evidence-Based Gun
Policy, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 691, 727 (2006) (explaining that empirical research can inform public policy on gun control by evaluating the public
success of possible interventions and pinpointing the areas in which regulatory
enforcement would be most effective).
235. Cf. Paul Burstein, The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29, 31 (2003) (commenting that public
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Laurens Walker’s influential article on institutional design, A
Theory of Procedure. It explicitly tests the empirical tenets of
Thibaut and Walker’s theory; tests the tenets of a new, relational
model of procedure; and explores the implications of the results
to several aspects of legal dispute resolution.
This Article tests a relational model of legal institutional legitimacy, which claims that the public is more willing to legitimize a legal tribunal’s decisions if the perceived objective of the
conflict—either to discover the truth or to provide a just allocation of resources—aligns with the priorities of the procedures
that are used to resolve the dispute.236 The results from the first
study suggest that the public perceives legal dispute resolution
as concerned with the complementary goals of establishing factual truth and providing a just allocation of resources to litigants. But the first study also suggests that Thibaut and
Walker’s theory is incomplete, insofar as it claims that all legal
disputes primarily involve questions of justice.237 Instead, there
is substantial variation in terms of the public’s perceptions of the
objectives of different legal conflicts and in their perceptions of
the objectives of different phases of a trial.
The second study provides support for Thibaut and Walker’s
claim that different dispute resolution procedures appear to prioritize different conflict resolution objectives. Because the adversary system provides litigants with substantial control and voice
over the proceedings, they associate adversarial systems with
prioritizing justice over factual truth. In contrast, the inquisitorial system is perceived to prioritize truth by vesting substantial
investigatory authority in a central decision maker. Both procedures can foster institutional legitimacy, but they do so in different ways: the inquisitorial procedure fosters legitimacy through
its emphasis on fact gathering, whereas the adversarial procedure fosters legitimacy by prioritizing fair procedures for gathering facts.
The final study examines the implications for institutional
legitimacy. It found that the public is most willing to legitimize
legal tribunals when there is a relational alignment between the
conflict resolution goal to be reached—either attaining the truth

interest organizations can enhance policymakers’ responsiveness to public opinion by providing useful information about what the public wants).
236. See supra Part I.A.2.
237. Their taxonomy also is incomplete insofar as it addresses the “effectiveness” of legal procedures instead of their popular legitimacy.
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or providing justice—and the priority of the procedure that resolves the dispute. Several implications flow from these findings
for theories of institutional legitimacy, for actors involved in public and private dispute resolution, and for the design of legal tribunals.
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
Perhaps the most important result from these studies is
that, contrary to Thibaut and Walker’s assertions, the public
does not view all legal cases as relational conflicts that should be
resolved through adversarial means. Instead, the public is willing to sacrifice some procedural control—and the relational benefits that come with it—in cases where questions of relationality
are not the paramount issue to be resolved. Indeed, the results
suggest that policymakers should consider the following reforms.
First, the penalty phase of legal proceedings generally should be
decided via adversarial methods, which prioritize the just allocation of resources, at least compared to the liability phase. 238
Second, views of the appropriate procedure to evaluate disputes
in the liability phase are heavily contingent on the degree of relationality involved in the proceeding. Thus, whodunit trials, in
which the defendant categorically denies the act of which he is
civilly or criminally accused, should be afforded leeway to include inquisitorial methods to resolve the dispute, which prioritize establishing decisional accuracy. In contrast, questions involving relational judgments—such as determining whether a
defendant’s admitted acts constitute negligence—should normally be resolved pursuant to adversarial methods, which prioritize relational interests.
Third, by reformulating Thibaut and Walker’s taxonomy of
cases and procedures into a relationality continuum, several
types of cases will fall within the margins. For example, certain
breach of contract cases might have strong non-relational elements—such as the determination of what a contract term objectively means—that must be viewed in light of relational concerns, such as what the terms meant to the different parties
within the context of their business relationship with each other.
In these cases, policymakers might experiment with combining

238. The analysis revealed a weaker difference between relational and nonrelational cases in the punishment context, although there may exist disputes
in which inquisitorial methods are appropriate for the punishment phase. Future research should examine this possibility.
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features of adversarial and inquisitorial trials that will effectuate the competing objectives. For example, the court might itself
collect the evidence necessary to determine the meaning of a contract (a feature of the inquisitorial paradigm) while allowing the
parties to comment on the evidence or meaningfully cross-examine witnesses to assess each party’s subjective understanding of
the contract terms (a feature of the adversarial paradigm).
Rethinking Thibaut and Walker’s dispute classifications
along a relationality continuum would allow legal tribunals to
attain greater popular legitimacy. For example, in an ordinary
negligence case, it may initially appear beneficial to create expensive procedures that are well-calibrated to determine the exact speed a vehicle was traveling, the precise amount of daylight
that existed when the accident occurred, or the exact amount of
foliage that obscured a driver’s view. But the resources invested
in that procedure would be ill-spent if the public perceives the
tribunal’s ultimate decision to be a holistic, relational judgment
in which the defendant’s actions are compared to in-group
norms. There, the factual predicates, although important, are
not the primary determinant of the outcome and would be subordinate to the relational judgment, which a different procedure
might prioritize better.
Conversely, other scholars have commented on the increased “scientization” of proof in various legal settings,239 an inevitable consequence of the expanding role of technology in the
legal context.240 As relevant technology for resolving disputes
improves, the relationality continuum allows those disputes to
move fluidly along the spectrum in favor of more inquisitorial
procedures. In that sense, procedural reforms would be able to
keep pace with the evolving types of proof that appear in these
trials (and presumably with the objectives that are valued the
most).
Additionally, in cases in which, for example, the truth objective is the predominant concern because of increased “scientiza-

239. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 145 (1997)
(“More than the court’s paradigmatic composition, the scientization of proof
strains the traditional concept of the trial as a continuous, climatic event.”).
240. For a thorough critique of the dangers of the “seconding” of scientific
technology into the legal system, see COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE
FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QT7-PNYD].
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tion,” policymakers could consider concomitant reforms to evidentiary rules and local court customs to facilitate the truthseeking objective. Specifically, where a central inquisitorial
body—either a single judge or a judge and jury241—selects the
information by which the dispute is decided, it may be advantageous to relax or eliminate the restrictions on character evidence
and hearsay, in light of empirical evidence suggesting that these
rules may unnecessarily stymie the accurate fact-finding endeavor.242
These reforms may be easier to adopt initially in the alternative dispute resolution context, which generally does not require the parties to adhere to the formal procedural rules of the
courtroom.243 Nonetheless, a full-scale, immediate redesign of
the current procedural regime would not be prudent or possible.
Rather, these reforms might develop as a result of incremental
changes, such as adding or removing certain relational or nonrelational design features over time. The results from the studies
reported in this Article, and the empirical findings from which
the studies here were derived, provide policymakers with a
roadmap to effectuate those changes.
Skeptics might criticize the cost of implementing the policy
recommendations that flow from the results of these studies. Doing so would require extensive classifications not just of different
types of cases—and their conflict resolution objectives—but also

241. Articles VI and VII of the United States Constitution allow trials by
jury for certain alleged wrongs; these protections have also been extended, to
varying extents, to citizens in state tribunals. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413
U.S. 149, 160 (1973) (affirming the right to a six-person jury in federal civil
trials); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (extending the jury right
to defendants charged with serious crimes).
242. See, e.g., Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and
Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879 (2015) (criticizing the hearsay rule);
David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 407 (2013) (criticizing the rules regarding evidentiary instructions); H.
Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing
Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 789–93 (1993) (criticizing the character evidence rule). The procedural reforms suggested by the results reported
here may also result in the reform of substantive contract, tort, or criminal law
principles. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to address these issues
here, the results I report can serve as a springboard for further academic debate
regarding the interrelation between procedural and substantive legal reforms.
243. See, e.g., LAURIE S. COLTRI, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A
CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS APPROACH (2d ed. 2010) (explaining the basic principles
and tenets of mediation and arbitration procedures).
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of varying procedures for resolving those disputes. Difficult decisions would need to be made regarding where a dispute falls on
the relationality continuum and which procedural features
would be the most appropriate for resolving the dispute. Moreover, the act of making substantial changes to entrenched legal
norms might be disruptive enough to threaten the popular legitimacy of the new institutional design.
These are legitimate concerns that policymakers should review carefully. Policy change and implementation is never costless; it necessarily involves a complex cost-benefit analysis balancing the benefits of the new institutional design against the
drawbacks associated with (1) the disruption created by a new
system, and (2) the costs that the new system itself may impose
on the public. Procedural reforms consistent with the empirical
results reported in this Article—for example, rethinking portions of evidentiary rules in cases in which an inquisitorial tribunal makes a criminal liability determination—might result in
constitutional challenges involving, for example, the defendant’s
right to confront her accuser. Other commentators have provided
answers to these types of questions,244 but the potential for such
disputes imposes additional costs on litigants.
Nonetheless, large-scale and small-scale policy change happens frequently under the law. Moreover, the recommendations
suggested here may have unique advantages that can aid their
implementation. First, unlike other areas of the law where empirical research is inchoate or newly developing, the research on
institutional legitimacy has accumulated a critical mass of peerreviewed scholarship that converges on several principles for effective institutional design.245 Moreover, there is a wealth of respected scholars—in the United States and internationally—
who produce cutting-edge research in this area. The United
States Congress, many of its state counterparts, and various
think tanks across the country also are staffed with individuals
who are qualified to evaluate this research and to implement its
recommendations in ways that minimize disruption.246
244. See, e.g., Fern Nesson & Charles Nesson, Confrontation: Getting It
Right, HARV. L. REC. (Sept. 9, 2015), http://hlrecord.org/confrontation-getting-it
-right/ [https://perma.cc/M46Z-W33H].
245. See generally Tyler & Sevier, supra note 14 (reviewing a litany of experimental evidence suggesting that a values-based approach to institutional
design is superior to a punishment-based approach).
246. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 13–16 (2009). This process has resulted in
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These resources are critically important with respect to the
recommendations that flow from the findings reported here.
These studies specifically examined the outer bounds of the relationality continuum—for example, cases that were either very
low or high in relationality—and did not focus on disputes that
form the interior of the continuum.247 When testing a new theory, it is necessary to examine the outer boundaries first before
determining whether further research is warranted. Once those
boundaries are established, future research, either in the form
of academic scholarship or research in the political realm, will
contribute valuable insight into the nuances inherent in the relationality continuum.
Second, there are forums within the legal system that are
equipped for experimenting with institutional design features.
Several state courts across the country serve as “innovation laboratories” for policy changes affecting the administration of
trial proceedings.248 One of the most well-known of these realworld laboratories is the Arizona Jury Project, which specializes
in procedural reforms that relate to jury decisionmaking.249 The
participating Arizona trial courts have allowed judges and attorneys to experiment with varying “local” rules, such as allowing
jurors to take notes during the proceedings, allowing them to ask
questions of witnesses and the parties, and allowing them to consult with one another while the case is in progress.250 These laboratories might be the ideal testing grounds for similar procedural innovations suggested by the findings reported in this
Article.

dramatic procedural reforms, including the development of specialty tribunals
like the Delaware Court of Chancery and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. Id.
247. Several countries, such as Italy, employ hybrid inquisitorial procedures
to resolve legal conflicts. The specifics of these hybrids vary, but they often incorporate an element of cross-examination that supplements the primary factfinding authority of the central decision maker. See, e.g., JOACHIM ZEKOLL,
COMPARATIVE CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
LAW (2006).
248. See, e.g., Justin Sevier, The Unintended Consequences of Local Rules,
21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291, 293 (2011).
249. See, e.g., Stephen Susman, Innovative Jury Trials, CIV. JURY PROJECT
AT NYU SCH. L. (Aug. 19, 2017), https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/innovative
-jury-trials/ [https://perma.cc/JV45-KT8F] (discussing the achievements of the
Arizona Jury Project and its cousin, the NYU Civil Jury Project, among others).
250. Id.; see also Sevier, supra note 248, at 300.
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Finally, and more generally, skeptics might question the use
of empirical evidence in debates over legal policy. As I have written recently in more detail:
The judiciary has historically had a complex relationship with social
science . . . . Empirical studies have shaped legal policy in a variety of
areas, including eyewitness identification, false confessions, the size
and shape of juries, the manner of proving discrimination, the regulation of corporate behavior, and the implementation of the death penalty. It is, of course, important not to overstate the implications of any
one empirical study. But it is also important to situate empirical studies within the literature on which they are based to draw appropriate
and measured conclusions about their findings.251

CONCLUSION
Mary Churukian and Clayton LaGest likely did not know
that their run-of-the-mill vehicular negligence dispute would
provoke such lofty, philosophical questions from the justices of
the Michigan Supreme Court regarding the purpose of conflict
resolution and its intersection with institutional design.252 What
they likely did know, however, was the extent to which they were
willing to abide by the legal tribunal’s decision as a function of
the manner in which it evaluated the case.
The findings reported in this Article—and the literature on
institutional design in which those findings are situated—suggest that legal policymakers would do well to ensure that the
objectives of different legal disputes align with the relational signals that the procedures which resolve those disputes send to
litigants. Doing so will likely result in a dispute resolution system that aligns more closely with the public’s values and policy
preferences, and in turn, greater public legitimacy.

251. Sevier, supra note 82, at 507 (citing ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAW (Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein eds., 3d vol. 2018)). The design of
Study 3 in this Article allowed for a conceptual replication of the findings reported in Studies 1 and 2. The results from those studies replicated in Study 3.
See supra Part III.C.2.
252. Churukian v. LaGest, 97 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 1959); see supra notes 1–
12 and accompanying text.

